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     Abstract 
 
 From 1939 to 1942 Canada, allied to the United Kingdom, prepared to defend itself against 
chemical attack by Nazi Germany. The Canadian preparations represented one of Canada’s many 
contributions to the cause of the British Commonwealth, and may have been used as one method to 
counter British requests for additional ground troops. After the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor, 
Canada became part of an alliance with the United States and the United Kingdom. Canadian 
chemical warfare preparations went from defensive to offensive following the attack on Pearl Harbor 
and the entry of the United States into the war. The chemical warfare preparations included 
preparation and testing of toxic gases and smokes, smoke screening and flame weapons. 
 One of the most important Canadian contributions to the alliance was the establishment of the 
Suffield Field Experimental Station in Alberta. This base was particularly useful in carrying out 
chemical weapon trials, during which approximately 2000 Canadian citizens and soldiers were 
exposed to toxic gases. At the beginning of the war chemical warfare volunteers were completely 
covered in protective clothing except for a patch to allow for controlled chemical burns. But by 1942 
Suffield staff was given permission to rewrite the regulations for the trials, and volunteers often 
received significant chemical injuries, including to the eyes. It would appear that the full body of 
knowledge available to the wartime scientists, especially information relevant to the long-term health 
outcomes of exposure to vesicant agents, was not applied in the conduct of the human 
experimentation. 
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                    Chapter 1 
   Chemical Warfare between the World Wars  
Chemical warfare has been branded as inhumane. Humanity is not a word to mention when 
discussing War. 1 
 
 During the First World War, the combatants developed many techniques to overcome the 
defensive power of barbed wire, machine guns, and trench systems. These techniques included the 
refinement of battlefield tactics, production and use of tanks, artillery usage on an unprecedented 
scale (aided by sound-ranging and registered fire), tunneling and mine warfare, and the use of 
chemical weapons.2 Of these military technologies, the most controversial was undoubtedly chemical 
warfare. The feelings of shock and outrage produced by the use of poison gas were augmented by the 
fact that poison gas was specifically outlawed by international law.3 The French were the first to use 
tear gas to harass the enemy during the First World War.4 The first large-scale deployment of 
chemical weapons occurred in the Second Battle of Ypres, April 22 1915, when the Germans 
attacked French, Canadian, and Algerian troops with chlorine gas discharged from cylinders. The use 
                                                 
1
 National Archives of the United Kingdom (hereafter NA (UK)), War Office (hereafter WO) 188/213, Major Galwery, 
lecture to Staff College, Camberley, February 18 1928.  
 
2
 P. Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front  (London 1994); K. Macksey, and J. Batchelor, Tank  (London 1971); J. 
Glanfield, The Devil's Chariots: The Birth and Secret Battles of the First Tanks  (Stroud 2006); M. Farndale, History of 
the Royal Regiment of Artillery, Western Front 1914-18  (Dorchester 1986); P. Barton, P. Doyle, and J. Vandewalle, The 
Tunnellers’ War 1914-18  (Montreal 2004). 
 
3
 Yale Law School, “Laws of War: Declaration on the Use of Projectiles the Object of Which is the Diffusion of 
Asphyxiating or Deleterious Gases”, July 29 1899, The Avalon Project. 
 
4
 L. F. Haber, The Poisonous Cloud, Chemical Warfare in the First World War  (Oxford 1986), p.23. 
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of chemical weapons was proposed and developed by German chemist Dr. Fritz Haber.5 The large-
scale use of chemicals as weapons of war was an act of desperation by the German High Command 
to attempt to break the trench war stalemate on the Western Front. During the course of the First 
World War, approximately 150,965 tonnes of pulmonary, lachrymatory, and vesicant agents were 
deployed by both sides.6   
 The battlefield effects of chemical weapons were eventually limited by the development of 
more sophisticated protection against them. Protective clothing and efficient respirators were 
produced that offered better defence, even though they hindered the mobility of troops. The number 
of casualties from chemical weapons fell dramatically as a result. Before effective masks and 
respirators were introduced, the mortality rate among those on the receiving end of toxic chemicals 
was some 40 percent; by 1918, this had fallen to 2.5 percent, despite the introduction of more lethal 
chemicals such as sulphur mustard. Indeed, an overall evaluation of the effect of chemical weapons in 
the First World War suggests that they played a far less crucial role in the balance of military power 
than their notoriety would suggest. Opinion is divided over the battlefield effectiveness of gas 
warfare in the First World War. British official historian James Edmonds7 observed: “Gas achieved 
but local success, nothing decisive; it made war uncomfortable, to no purpose,” while Fritz Haber 
insisted “If the war had gone on until 1919 you would have won by gas alone.”8  
                                                 
5
 Fritz Haber (December 9 1868 – January 29 1934) was a German chemist, who received the Nobel Prize in Chemistry in 
1918 for his process for synthesizing ammonia, important for making fertilizers and explosives. He, along with Walther 
Nernst, is also credited as the "father of chemical warfare" for his work in the deployment of chlorine and other war gases 
during the First World War. See Nobel Lectures, Chemistry 1901-1921 (Amsterdam 1966) for a biography of Fritz Haber. 
 
 
6
 K. Coleman, A History of Chemical Warfare (Basingstoke 2005), p. 34. Gas casualty figures for each belligerent during 
the First World War. 
 
7
 James Edward Edmonds CB, CMG (1861–1956) was a British First World War officer of the Royal Engineers who in 
the role of British official historian was responsible for the post-war compilation of the 28-volume History of the Great 
War. 
 
8
 A. Palazzo, Seeking Victory on the Western Front, The British Army and Chemical Warfare in World War 1, (Lincoln  
2000), p. 1.  
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 Estimates of military casualties directly caused by chemical weapons during the course of the 
First World War suggest that for the British Army the gas mortality rate was 4.3% of total casualties.9 
The mortality rates for all other combatants were approximately the same, except for the Russian 
Army. It is also true that 'gas' became an important psychological weapon. Soldiers were haunted by 
the memory of the chemical poisoning of the early years of the war, and obsessed by the fear of 
becoming contaminated by the invisible agent mustard gas. Thus the use of gas caused a far greater 
outcry than the horrific casualties caused by machine-guns and artillery barrages. It was perhaps 
easier to express the horror of war by focusing on the effects of new rather than traditional weapons. 
Civilian reactions were perhaps coloured not just by the unusual sufferings of those wounded by the 
chemicals, but also by widespread apprehension regarding the future power of science and 
technology. On the other hand, the experience of chemical poisoning of front-line soldiers deepened 
their sense of hatred against the enemy. As a Canadian soldier who saw some of his comrades killed 
by poison gas wrote, “we who inhaled less of the filthy noxiousness grew black with a deadlier hate. 
Then, with what strength we could gather, did we kill and kill and kill. More, we butchered 
savagely.” 10 
 Political events after the First World War suggest that the major powers regarded poison gas 
as a dangerous weapon of mass destruction which had to be controlled by international agreement. 
For example, Article 171 of the Treaty of Versailles11 specifically prohibited Germany from 
possessing chemical weapons or the materials to manufacture them. Some politicians such as 
                                                 
9
 J. W. Hammond, Jr., Poison Gas: The Myths versus Reality. (Connecticut 1999), pp. 33-36. Details of the various 
chemical warfare gases, their characteristics and medical treatment may also be found in Hammond. 
 
10
 J. Bourke, An Intimate History of  Killing: Face-to-Face Killing in Twentieth-Century Warfare, (New York 1999).  
 
11
  “Articles 159-213 Military, Naval and Air Clauses”, Article 171, Peace Treaty of Versailles. 
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Winston Churchill,12 however, were calling for their further development for use by the air force. As 
British Secretary for War and Air in 1919, he proposed that bombs filled with chemicals be dropped 
by air behind enemy lines. But British air chiefs were reluctant to take up his proposal because they 
could not guarantee that the bombs would hit their target, revealing a continuing concern not to use 
poisonous bombs against civilians. In spite of various attempts to justify the use of chemical weapons 
on economic grounds, or as a humane weapon,13 the attitude of soldiers and the British public was to 
ban their use.14 In the words of Lord Fisher, the President of the British Board of Trade: “the public 
thought that poison gas was a low game and they think so still.” 15  
 While gas had been deemed a battlefield failure in the First World War, the possibility of the 
large-scale use of chemical weapons in any future war deeply concerned people during the interwar 
years.16  The public outcry against the use of chemical weapons was reflected in a welter of 
international treaties in the aftermath of the war.17 Earlier conventions, such as the first and second 
Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, which had explicitly banned chemical weapons, had 
failed to prevent their use in war. Indeed, all the belligerents of the First World War, except Italy, had 
ratified the conditions of the Second Hague Conference on the eve of hostilities. In the post-war 
                                                 
12
 Sir Winston Leonard Spencer-Churchill (November 30 1874 – January 24 1965) was a British politician known chiefly 
for his leadership of Great Britain during the Second World War, serving as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 
1940 to 1945. In the First World War he served as First Lord of the Admiralty, Minister of Munitions, Secretary of State 
for War, and Secretary of State for Air. During the interwar years, he served as Chancellor of the Exchequer. 
 
13
 J.B.S. Haldane, Callinicus: A Defence of Chemical Warfare, (London 1925). 
 
14
 The Special Brigade of the British Army, which was commanded by Brigadier (later Major-General) Charles Howard 
Foulkes and which was responsible for British chemical warfare from 1915 until the end of the First World War, was 
unceremoniously disbanded in 1919 and as little acknowledgement of its existence as possible was made in later years. 
Buckingham Palace refused permission to publish photographs of the Royal family associated in any manner with gas 
warfare or even demonstrations of smoke. 
 
15
 NA (UK), (Cabinet, hereafter CAB) 24/106, Lord Fisher “Gas warfare”, May 17, 1920. 
 
16
 These and related problems are discussed in detail in Haber, Chapter 12. 
 
17
 For a scholarly discussion of  the taboo regarding the use of chemical weapons see R. Price and N. Tannenwald, 
“Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboos.” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and 
Identity in World Politics, ed.  P. J. Katzenstein New York, 1996, pp. 114-152. 
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period, under the guidance of British politician Lord Robert Cecil,18 the Temporary Mixed 
Commission for the Reduction of Armaments19 issued in 1924 “The Report of the Committee 
appointed to consider the Question of Chemical and Biological Warfare.” One of the possibilities 
discussed in the Report was the use of aircraft to drop gas bombs, in particular mustard gas, on 
civilians. Bearing in mind that German airships and bombers had attacked London and other British 
cities during the First World War with high explosives, this possibility was quite real. By the end of 
the First World War, the effective use of chemical weapons had been largely confined to artillery, 
limiting their radius of action to the range of field guns, and having as the stage for their deployment 
the military (and male-dominated) battlefield. The use of aircraft to deliver chemical weapons, 
however, greatly increased the scale and changed the nature of the chemical battlefield. 
 At the 1925 Conference on the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms, the subject of 
chemical weapons was raised and led to the Geneva Protocol, adopted on June 17 1925. This brief 
document prohibited the use of chemical (and bacteriological) weapons, bound each signatory as 
regards other signatories (that is, it was multilateral), and urged the signatories to ratify the protocol 
as soon as possible. Between 1925 and 1930 many countries ratified the protocol, though they usually 
qualified their adherence by insisting that “the Protocol ceased to bind if any enemy fails to respect 
it.” Spain, the United States, and Japan failed to ratify the agreement.20 However, the nations signing 
the Geneva Protocol had agreed only to ban the first use of chemical weapons against one another, 
giving themselves a free hand to deploy them against non-signatory nations, and to respond in kind 
                                                 
18
 Lord Robert Cecil, 1st Viscount Cecil of Chelwood from 1868 to 1923, was a lawyer, politician and diplomat in the 
United Kingdom. He was one of the architects of the League of Nations and a faithful defender of it; his decades of 
service to that organization saw him awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1937. 
 
19
  “Report of the Temporary Mixed Commission for the Reduction of Armaments”, League of Nations Statistical and 
Disarmament Documents, Documents 1 to 8 of the 8 documents, containing the report of the temporary mixed 
commission for the reduction of armaments. Found at http://www.library.northwestern.edu/otcgi/digilib/llscgi60.exe 
  
20
 Spain became a signatory on August 22 1929.  Japan and the United States did not become party to the Geneva 
Protocol until respectively 1970 and 1975. See the Bioweapons Prevention website at 
http://www.bwpp.org/BWnorm/1925GenevaProtocol.html for the details.  
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against another signatory that had broken the agreement. Thus the Geneva Protocol was essentially a 
“no first use” agreement against other signatories. And the treaty was clearly Eurocentric. In the 
various minor wars that followed the First World War and the break-up of great empires, chemical 
weapons were used to deadly effect, and with little compunction, against soldiers and civilians in 
African and Asian countries fighting against the presence of colonial powers. 
  The British air force reputedly used chemical weapons (in the form of arsenic smoke) in 
support of the Russian White Army against the Russian Red Army in Murmansk and Archangel in 
the summer of 1919. There is no primary source material to support this contention.21 The British, 
however, definitely wished to retain the option to employ both non-lethal tear gases and perhaps 
mustard gas in colonial campaigns to impede the movement and fighting power of unprotected 
tribesmen.22 In the 1920s there was a general belief, which Britain shared, that the rules of war 
applied to only conflict "between civilized nations." It was stated explicitly in the Manual of Military 
Law of 1914 that "they do not apply in wars with uncivilized States and tribes." In a War Office 
minute of May 12 1919, Winston Churchill argued for the use of tear gas:  
I do not understand this squeamishness about the use of gas. We have definitely 
adopted the position at the Peace Conference of arguing in favour of the 
retention of gas as a permanent method of warfare. It is sheer affectation to 
lacerate a man with the poisonous fragment of a bursting shell and to boggle at 
making his eyes water by means of lachrymatory gas. I am strongly in favour of 
using poisoned gas against uncivilised tribes. The moral effect should be so 
good that the loss of life should be reduced to a minimum. It is not necessary to 
use only the most deadly gasses: gasses can be used which cause great 
inconvenience and would spread a lively terror and yet would leave no serious 
permanent effects on most of those affected.23  
                                                 
21
 L. F. Haber in The Poisonous Cloud, Chemical Warfare in the First World War, (Oxford 1986), does mention the 
incident or incidents, but he says: “It sounds unbelievable and I have found no corroboration.” P.  Satia, “The Defense of 
Inhumanity: Air Control and the British Idea of Arabia”, The American Historical Review, February 2006, includes a 
footnote discussing the misunderstanding of the interest of Churchill in the possible use of non-lethal gasses. Historian 
Anthony Clayton, writing in the Oxford History of the British Empire: vol. four: The Twentieth Century, (Oxford 1998) 
states that "The use of poisonous gas was never sanctioned.”  
22
 NA (UK) WO 32/5184. 
 
23
 M. Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, companion volume 4, part 1, (London 1976) 
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The British Cabinet was reluctant, however, to sanction the use of a weapon that had caused such 
suffering and public revulsion in the recent war.  
 The first substantiated use of chemical weapons after the First World War was during the 
Third Rif War in Spanish Morocco between 1921 and 1927.24 The Spanish Army of Africa dropped 
chemical warfare agents in an attempt to put down the Riffian Berber rebellion led by guerrilla leader 
Abd el-Krim. These attacks in 1924 marked the first time mustard gas was dropped from aircraft, a 
year before the Geneva Protocol was signed. The gas used in these attacks was produced by the 
Fabrica Nacional de Productos Químicos at La Marañosa near Madrid. This plant was founded with 
significant assistance from Germany and especially Hugo Stoltzenberg, a chemist associated with the 
German government's clandestine chemical warfare activities in the early 1920s. Balfour states that 
“The practice of Spanish airmen was to drop gas bombs in villages where markets were being held, 
either the day before this gathering, or while the market was going on.”25  
 Ten years after the Geneva Protocol had been signed, the use of chemical weapons on a large 
scale occurred once more. This took place during the Italo-Abyssinian war of 1935-1936 and 
constituted a blatant violation of the Geneva Protocol, as both Italy and Ethiopia were signatory 
states. Benito Mussolini, the fascist dictator of Italy, had long held a desire for an Italian Empire to 
rule beyond the Mediterranean, and often talked of building a new Roman Empire. Abyssinia was the 
prime candidate of this expansionist goal. It has been suggested that the Italians resolved to attack 
Abyssinia in order to "reclaim" the country and to avenge their defeat at Adua during the First Italo-
                                                 
24
 In his recent book Deadly Embrace: Morocco and the Road to the Spanish Civil War (Oxford 2002), historian Sebastian 
Balfour has presented the results of five years of intensive research in public and private archives in Spain and military 
and diplomatic archives in Britain and France, along with the product of personal interviews of veterans and survivors of 
the colonial war in Morocco. One result of his research was a record of the “Secret History of Chemical Warfare against 
Moroccans.” 
 
25
 Balfour, Deadly Embrace: Morocco and the Road to the Spanish Civil War, p. 139. 
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Abyssinian War.26 By mid-December, General De Bono was replaced by General Pietro Badoglio 
due to the slow, cautious nature of his advance. Emperor Haile Selassie decided to test this new 
general with an attack, but his forces were repulsed when Badoglio started to use poison gas.27 
Although Mussolini had ratified the Geneva Protocol in 1928, he apparently had no inhibitions about 
the use of poison gases against those incapable of effective gas defense. In fact, he had previously 
authorized the gas bombing of Libyan rebels in the late 1920s under conditions of the strictest 
secrecy.28 On March 29 1936, Graziani's forces firebombed the city of Harar. Two days later the last 
major battle of the war, the Battle of Maychew, was fought with the Italians victorious. Haile Selassie 
then fled into exile in England on May 2 and Badoglio's forces took the capital, Addis Ababa on May 
5. Italy annexed the country on May 7 and the Italian King Victor Emmanuel III was proclaimed 
Emperor on May 9 1936. Italy then merged Eritrea, Abyssinia and Somaliland into a single state 
known as Italian East Africa.  
 When Emperor Haile Selassie had protested to the League of Nations about the gas attacks on 
December 30 1935, chemical warfare became an international political issue.29 After the Committee 
of Thirteen30 received accounts of gas attacks in this war, supported by medical testimony, 
photographic evidence of mustard gas burns 31 and information about Italian shipments of gas and 
bombs through the Suez Canal, it was not possible to ignore the events. In the League of Nations, 
                                                 
26
 A detailed analysis of the clash between Ethiopia (Abyssinia) and Fascist Italy has been presented by historian Alberto 
Sbacchi., Legacy of Bitterness: Ethiopia and Fascist Italy, 1935-1941, (Lawrenceville 1998).  
 
27
 Sbacchi, Legacy of Bitterness, pp. 36-39. 
 
28
 D. Mack Smith, Mussolini (London 1981) pp. 157;171. 
 
29
 Haile Selassie, "Appeal to the League of Nations", June 1936.The appeal may be read at:  
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/selassie.htm and viewed at:  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AQJ1WfJu3fQ 
 
30
 A body appointed by the Council of the League of Nations to examine the situation in Abyssinia. 
 
31
 See International Committee of the Red Cross, Bernard Bridel, “ Les ambulances à croix rouge du CICR sous les gaz 
en Ethiopie” Le Temps, August 13 2003. 
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Italy did not explicitly deny the use of gas but asserted the right of reprisal against Abyssinian 
atrocities which supposedly included the torture and decapitation of Italian prisoners, emasculation of 
the dead and wounded, abuse of the Red Cross emblem, and the use of “dum-dum” bullets.32 The 
Geneva Protocol, however, only allowed for retaliation against a first attack with chemical weapons, 
not first use in retaliation for an attack with different weapons.  
 Estimates suggest that Italy used around 700 tons of chemical agents, mostly delivered by the 
Italian air force using airburst bombs and aerial spraying.33 During those attacks, in addition to 
military casualties, there were civilian victims as well. Reports on the horrible consequences were 
mainly obtained from physicians, representatives of such organizations as the Red Cross, and 
journalists. John Melly, head of a field hospital of the British Red Cross in Ethiopia described that 
war as follows: "It is not a war, it is not even a slaughter – it is a torture of thousands of defenceless 
men, women and children." 34 Poisonous gases were used not only during the 1935-1936 military 
campaign, but also during the occupation against Ethiopian rebels.  
 Another nation which had territorial ambitions outside of its own borders was Japan. On 
September 18 1931, a small bomb exploded underneath a section of track on the South Manchuria 
Railroad. The Japanese Army, which under long-standing agreements policed the railroad, used this 
incident as a pretext for launching operations aimed at conquering all of Manchuria. The Japanese 
were believed to hold a wide range of war gases, including chlorine, phosgene, mustard, lewisite, 
adamsite, and cyanic acid. Various methods for delivery of gas munitions were reportedly developed, 
such as bombing and spraying from aircraft, gas shells, mines, mortars, projectors, and other 
                                                 
32
  Sbacchi, pp. 63-66. 
 
33
 “The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Vol. 1”, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 
(Stockholm 1971), p. 44. 
 
34
 Cambridge University Library, Royal Commonwealth Society Library, J.W.S. Macfie Ethiopian collection 1935-36, 
GBR/0115/Y304296A. 
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apparatus for ground contamination. Reports of Japanese gas attacks on the Chinese in 1937 and 
1938 added to concern about Japanese chemical capabilities.35 The Chinese Gas Defence Department 
of the Ministry of War recorded nine gas attacks in the first six months of the war.36 The sessions of 
the League Assembly in the fall and winter of 1932-1933 were devoted largely to the Manchurian 
issue. After prolonged debate the Assembly adopted on February 24 1933 a resolution refusing to 
recognize Manchukuo and calling on the Japanese to retire. This resulted in the resignation (effective 
in two years' time) of Japan from the League of Nations.37 The legacy of these events still affects 
Sino-Japanese relations even today. 
 In many countries during the inter-war years, governmental sensitivity to public opinion, 
international law, and the dubious military value of chemical weapons, all restricted further 
development. While in pre-1914 popular literature, the threatening aspect of science in war was of 
necessity speculative,38 after 1918 the most extraordinary prophecies of future warfare could be 
considered to have at least some basis in reality. The British had already seen the effects of the 
revolution in the technology of warfare in the form of U-boats, poison gas attack, and their direct 
experience of aerial bombardment. It is easy to see why gas warfare and air attack became conjoined 
in the popular imagination in the 1920s and 1930s, as both were the newest technologies of war. In 
essence, if airplanes and gas warfare were so appalling in the First World War, what could advances 
in these technologies portend, but even more and far greater destructiveness? And who could 
legitimately claim to know what, if any, the eventual limits of possible advances were?  
                                                 
35
 NA(UK) WO 208/3044 
 
36
 For a more detailed discussion of the military events see the account in E. M. Spiers, Chemical Warfare, (Illinois 1986). 
Also see NA (UK) WO 33/1634, Nineteenth annual report of the Chemical Defence Research Department. 
 
37
 T. W. Burkman, World Affairs, v. 158, n. 1, 1995, p. 45. 
 
38
  The Tale of the Next Great War, 1871-1914: Fictions of Future Warfare and Battles Still-To-Come, (Ed. I. F. Clarke) 
(Syracuse 1995). 
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While the traumatic effects of the First World War affected all of Europe in profound ways, 
Britain, titular head of the British Commonwealth, experienced a new, previously unknown sense of 
vulnerability, which intruded on the interwar period. Specifically, the island nation was the victim of 
the first strategic bombing campaign in history. German use of airships, Gotha and later Giant 
bombers to strike England itself, the traditional defences provided by the English Channel and the 
Royal Navy notwithstanding, revealed the danger posed by the new technology of aviation. The first 
Battle of Britain was fought from 1915 until 1918. The psychological effect was enormous, and 
continued for the next two decades. Because Britain had remained sheltered behind its moat, the 
English Channel, for centuries, this effect was perhaps worse than it might have been for a European 
country with no such tradition of invulnerability.39  
 Four new major weapons had appeared in the First World War: submarines, tanks, aircraft, 
and gas. The use of poison gas, however, was the weapon which gave rise to the greatest popular 
disgust and fear. The numerous war gases ranged from lung agents like phosgene and chlorine to the 
blistering agent mustard gas, with chemists reputedly competing to discover even more deadly 
compounds. The idea of an aerial gas attack became widespread in the popular imagination during 
the 1920s, and especially in the early 1930s. Significantly, these two weapons, gas and airplanes, 
were viewed as the most difficult to defend against, and the most impersonal in their effects. British 
politician Stanley Baldwin, in the House of Commons on November 10 1932, prophesied: “No power 
on earth can protect the man in the street from being bombed. Whatever people may tell him, the 
                                                 
39
 P.  Meilinger, “Trenchard and Morale Bombing: The Evolution of Royal Air Force Doctrine before World War II," 
Journal of Military History, v. 60, n. 2, April 1996, p. 247. Many English cities were bombed by German airships and 
bombers, including London, Portsmouth (L. F. Paige, personal communication) and Lowestoft (R. J. Freeman, personal 
communication). See also H. G. Castle, Fire over England: the German Air Raids of World War 1 (London 1982). Also 
G. W. Haddow and P. M. Grosz, The German Giants: The Story of the R-Planes 1914-1919, (London 1962); N. Hanson, 
First Blitz, (London 2008).  It was Britain, not Germany, which carried out  fire bombing and the firestorm to its logical 
conclusion with the “thousand bomber” raids on Cologne, Hamburg and Dresden in the next war. 
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bomber will always get through.”40 The crew of a bomber flying high above a city cannot distinguish 
between civilian and soldier, nor can a cloud of poison gas once released. Indeed, both weapons kill 
indiscriminately by their very nature, being weapons of mass destruction rather than targeted 
weapons. This imbued them both with a uniquely threatening quality, much exploited by alarmist 
writers of that era. In 1925 it was postulated during debate that all of London could be gassed in three 
hours!41  According to Harold MacMillan, “We thought of air warfare in 1938 rather as people think 
of nuclear warfare today.”42 
 Protection from the perceived threat of gas was the most prominent feature of British civil 
defence preparations before the outbreak of the Second World War. Perhaps one reason for this 
concern was because British military authorities were knowledgeable about gas warfare and the 
effects of gas from the First World War experience. When Air Raid Precautions (ARP) became 
developed in 1935, it could draw on the expertise of the Chemical Defence Research Establishment 
(CDRE) at Porton Down in England, which had been at work for years studying gas problems. The 
Chemical Warfare Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence had also continued to research 
gas warfare and issued a report entitled The Protection of the Civil Population against Gas Attacks as 
early as 1925.43 Interestingly, this report helped persuade the ARP Committee that, in a future war, 
gas was not likely to be the first weapon used, without warning, against civilians. Nevertheless, 
probably because preparations for gas warfare were cheaper than the construction of huge public 
shelters to protect against air raids, and because of the popular fear gas provoked, it was gas warfare 
that was most systematically addressed by ARP planners in Britain. 
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 The late 1920s also saw the publication of a number of war memoirs and presentation of 
theatre performances relating the horrors of the trenches in the First World War. Such famous works 
as Erich Maria Remarque's All Quiet on the Western Front (1929)44 or Siegfried Sassoon’s Memoirs 
of an Infantry Officer (1930)45 described the violent and brutal nature of the last war. “On January 21 
1929 the curtain rose on the first performance of Journey’s End, the ultimate in antiwar plays, by 
Robert C. Sherriff, a thirty-three year old former insurance man who had served in the East Surrey 
Regiment’s Ninth Battalion through the bloody spring of 1917. Its audiences left the Savoy Theatre 
stunned but primed, now, for Robert Graves’s memoir  Goodbye to All That.”46 
 In order to dramatize the new terrors that science promised, anti-war or disarmament authors 
provided graphic detail of the hypothetical effects of air attack on civilians.47 Patrick Kyba's 
Covenants Without the Sword: Public Opinion and British Defence Policy 1931-1935 (1983) gives 
excellent examples of the alarmism in the press and from politicians concerning air attack. Uri 
Bialer’s The Shadow of the Bomber: The Fear of Air Attack and British Politics 1932-1939 (1980) is 
an excellent study of the effect the air threat had on inter-war domestic politics. Bialer says that the 
period after 1935 marked the point when the military (as opposed to the politicians) finally accepted 
that a devastating knock-out blow was possible, and that Germany would likely try to achieve it in a 
future war. By the time of the Munich crisis, all the years of warnings from the Foreign Office, the 
Air Ministry and others had acted to inhibit foreign policy. Hence appeasement. As Bialer concludes, 
the British preoccupation with air attack went “beyond the bounds of rational reflections.” 48 
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 A poison gas attack had never been experienced by the civilian population in Britain. Even 
during the First World War, most Britons could only read of its horrors and see the wounded victims. 
The information available to the public on gas warfare, therefore, was mainly from what experts told 
them. The influence of the unknown nature of gas on a mainly non-scientific population probably 
made it that much more fear-inspiring. Aviation was a reality, as could be seen by a glance at the sky, 
while chemical warfare was, for most, something that could only be imagined. Thus, after 1930, 
alarmist writers began to emphasize the weapon, gas, as much or more than the delivery system, the 
bomber. Gas air raids were described as:  
altogether horrible . . . much more dreadful than the air raids of the World 
War. They began with a nightmare of warning maroons, sirens, hooters and the 
shrill whistles of cyclist scouts, then swarms of frantic people running to and 
fro, all pride and dignity gone, seeking the nearest shelter and aid, and they 
ended for most of their victims in an extremity of physical suffering . . . In 
nearly every case the organization of refuges and gas masks broke down. 49  
 
Specifically addressing the inter-locked concepts of aviation and gas was Chemical Warfare (1930), 
a collection of papers from an international conference held by the Women's International League for 
Peace and Freedom in 1929. This collection featured typically military 'experts’ writing essays on 
various features of the use of gas in future war.50 As Martin Ceadel would say, by the 1930s "from 
‘expert optimism’ of this sort, novelists took up gas warfare almost to the neglect of other types of 
weapons."51  The general public also had other sources to show them what air attack would mean in a 
future war. By the early 1930s, reporting on real air attacks lent credibility to the imaginings of 
writers. Vicarious experience of modern bombing raids was provided by motion pictures of battle 
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areas around the globe. Those who had no memory of First World War bombing raids could see film 
of more recent air strikes, and thus had photographic imagery bring home to them the potentials of 
air attack. The first terror bombing with modern aircraft occurred on January 29 1932, when Japanese 
bombers struck the Chapei sector of the Chinese city of Shanghai.  “People paying their weekly visit 
to the cinema to watch Marlene Dietrich or Tarzan or Shirley Temple were able to see in the 
newsreels bombs falling and smoke rising from the ensuing explosions. It was an impressive 
spectacle.”52  
 Italy's invasion of Abyssinia in 1935 and its policy of terror bombing and battlefield use of 
poison gas caused apprehension of the nightmare of another world war involving poison gas. The 
Spanish Civil War similarly provided moviegoers numerous newsreels of cities being bombed, 
especially the raids on Barcelona and Madrid in 1938. The Munich Crisis of September 1938 surely 
represented the zenith of the fear which had animated the conceptions of war since the 1920s. British 
Prime Minister Chamberlain himself fully demonstrated the profound influence that fear of air attack 
had over him and the nation. Addressing the House of Commons on October 3 1938, days after 
returning to public acclaim with "peace in our time,”53 he referred to the anxieties the leadership had 
during the crisis: 
When the House met last Wednesday, we were all under the shadow of a great and 
imminent menace. War, in a form more stark and terrible than ever before, seemed 
to be staring us in the face . . . today, only a few days after, we all meet in joy and 
thankfulness that the prayers of millions have been answered, and a cloud of 
anxiety has been lifted from our hearts.54 
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He praised the efforts of the four powers who met at Munich, resolving the issue by discussion and 
not by fighting, "and thereby they have averted a catastrophe which would have ended civilization as 
we have known it.”55 The public was initially overjoyed, but Churchill, participating in the House of 
Commons debate on the resolution "that this house approves the policy of His Majesty's Government 
by which war was averted in the recent crisis and supports their efforts to secure a lasting peace," 
charged that the Government had "sustained a total and unmitigated defeat," and that "a disaster of 
the first magnitude has befallen Great Britain and France."56 
 Planning for defense against chemical attack was something that both addressed the concerns 
of the public and was also within financial reach of the Air Raid Precautions (ARP) Department.57 
ARP had developed an inexpensive, mass-production model gas mask, and, in 1936, began producing 
large numbers of these masks for free public distribution. Some 30 million were thought to be needed 
by those within range of air attack. This number would rise to over 50 million by early 1939, when 
the whole of the British Isles were assumed to be subject to air attack, due to Air Staff over-estimates 
of the range of German aircraft. Huge stockpiles of the civilian gas masks were built up in regional 
storage facilities, starting in 1935. Planning on providing masks to virtually every person in England, 
150,000 were made a week by January 1937, with 19,500,000 containers in storage by December 
1937. Concerned that the Nazis and Italians might use chemical weapons, British war planners had 
also authorized the development of offensive chemical warfare munitions and delivery systems 
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starting in 1937. These munitions included gas-filled artillery shells, mortar shells and aircraft sprays, 
all intended to make chemical weapon attacks more efficient. 
 By 1939 the known use of chemical weapons against civilian populations by military powers 
such as Italy and Japan, each possessing substantial chemical industries, and having chemical warfare 
schools as a component of their military establishments, was surely a reasonable source of concern to 
Britain and the Dominions. It seems clear that in several of the nations which would be belligerents in 
the Second World War, the military value of using chemical weapons against an enemy capable of 
counter-measures and chemical retaliation, was rightly questioned. However, in addition to the 
known military intentions of one’s own country, there is always in war the unknown intention of the 
enemy. It seems that by 1939 each of the major belligerents suspected its enemies of preparing to 
wage chemical war. Perhaps these suspicions were based on nothing more than intelligence 
indicating that the nations involved were exploring retaliatory chemical warfare initiatives. But in a 
tense international climate many planners interpreted these actions as first-use preparations. It would 
have been a brave (or foolhardy) leadership which would have ignored the potential for chemical 
warfare by 1939, given the blatant breaches of the international protocol which had already occurred. 
Perhaps chemical warfare preparations were a form of insurance? 
 On September 1 1939, the German army invaded Poland on Hitler’s orders and without a 
declaration of war. This action marked the beginning of the Second World War.58 On September 3, 
Britain, France, Australia and New Zealand declared war on Germany. The next day, the United 
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States made an announcement declaring its neutrality. After Parliament debated the matter, Canada 
declared war on Germany on September 10 1939.  
 Chemical warfare during the Second World War is an area of Canadian military history which 
has received little attention from historians. One book, Deadly Allies, Canada’s Secret War 1937-
1947,59 by journalist John Bryden presents a popular account of Canadian preparations to wage both 
chemical and biological warfare. This study, which contains an excellent bibliography, briefly 
reviews many Canadian Second World War activities such as biological warfare preparations; the 
Habakkuk (ice ship) project; personalities and politics; research on poison gases and explosives at 
selected Canadian universities, the establishment of the Suffield Station; the use of human subjects 
for experimental purposes, the disposal of chemical warfare agents in 1946, and the intelligence 
activities of the USSR as revealed by the defection of Igor Gouzenko which exposed Stalin's efforts 
to steal nuclear secrets. But there is little examination of the wider issues related to the history of 
Canadian involvement in chemical warfare during the Second World War. Why, for example, did 
Canada become involved in such activity even though the country was a signatory to the 1925 
Geneva Protocol? And how did the nature and kind of preparations change over the course of the 
war? These kinds of questions were not considered in this book.  
 Another book, The Science of War: Canadian Scientists and Allied Military Technology 
during the Second World War by Donald H. Avery contains a single chapter summarizing chemical 
warfare planning in Canada during the Second World War. This book is a well organized account of 
Canadian administrators and scientists, their relationships with Allied scientists, and an account of the 
scientific activities of the three North Atlantic nations which fought the Second World War. It 
describes the role which Canada played in the development of radar, RDX explosives, proximity 
fuses, chemical and biological warfare, and the atomic bomb. But it is not a detailed history of any 
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one component of Canadian science during the Second World War, especially chemical warfare 
preparations. Again, the wider historical questions are not addressed, such as why Canada willingly 
participated in chemical warfare preparations. 
 There is one M. A. thesis, “Canada and Chemical Warfare”,60 which examines the early 
history of chemical warfare, the industrial basis for First World War chemical warfare (the chlor-
alkali industry), the Canadian experience of chemical warfare during the First World War, Canadian 
policy regarding chemical warfare in the Second World War, the establishment of the Suffield Field 
Station, and finally, the post-Second World War efforts made by Canada to achieve chemical warfare 
disarmament. The thesis contains no details of the Canadian preparations and human testing 
programme for chemical weapons during the Second World War, or any discussion of the political 
factors which may have led the Mackenzie King government to participate in chemical warfare 
preparations from the beginning of the war. The only other Canadian thesis discussing chemical 
warfare is a Ph. D. thesis by Dominick Jenkins, “Poison and Justice: an Investigation into the Debate 
over Poison Gas after the First World War to Rethink Current Practices of  Judgment in Science, 
Industry, and the Military.”61 This thesis examines the 1919 coalition between the U.S. Army 
Chemical Warfare Service, the U.S. National Research Council, the American Chemical Society, and 
Du Pont. This coalition prevented the U. S. General Staff from demobilizing the Chemical Warfare 
Service, and it reinforced the wartime establishment of a science-based chemical industry. This thesis 
however, has no relevance to the Canadian Second World War experience.  
 It would appear that there is a place for a thesis which examines the Canadian contribution to 
Allied chemical warfare preparations during the Second World War. This thesis will examine the 
                                                 
60
 J. J. Bailliu, “Canada and Chemical Warfare”, M. A. thesis, Royal Military College, 1989. 
 
61
 D. Jenkins, “Poison and justice: an   investigation into the debate over poison gas after the Great War to rethink current 
practices of judgement in science, industry, and the military”, Ph. D thesis, Toronto 1996.  
 
 
  20  
 
political factors which persuaded Prime Minister Mackenzie King and his Liberal government to 
agree to chemical warfare testing. These chemical warfare preparations included the establishment of 
an experimental station at Suffield, Alberta, and the industrial scale preparation of war gases, in spite 
of Canada being a signatory to the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Canadian support for chemical warfare 
also raised many policy problems during the course of the Second World War, some of them 
associated with the demands of Allies of greater power and industrial strength, who on occasion 
neglected to consult their Canadian partner. Indeed, Canadian chemical warfare policy underwent a 
significant change upon the entry of the United States into the Second World War and the threat to 
the North American continent posed by Imperial Japanese forces. The legacy of these chemical war 
experiments includes the Canadian volunteers who subjected themselves to painful and dangerous 
tests for the sake of the Allied cause. As late as May 1944 the United States Chemical Warfare 
Service (CWS) was known to have difficulty in carrying out casualty tests with their own soldiers. 
One hundred Canadian volunteers were offered for use in American chemical warfare tests.62 
However, these soldiers, now veterans in their later years of life, received no recognition for service, 
nor compensation for injury, until 2004. The National Defence and Canadian Forces state that: 
In February 2004, the Ministers of National Defence and Veterans Affairs 
announced a recognition program to offer payments to Canadian veterans who 
volunteered to participate in chemical-warfare experiments, mainly in the Second 
World War era, in Suffield, Alberta, and Ottawa. Each eligible veteran was offered a 
one-time, tax-free payment of $24,000 in recognition of his or her service to Canada. 
The amount is comparable to previous payments to Canadian veterans. This 
payment is in addition to pension benefits to which these veterans may be eligible.63 
 
  The Library and Archives Canada files which represent the primary documentation for the 
thesis are not readily available. A search of the Library and Archives Canada web site for records 
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dealing with chemical warfare from 1939 to 1945 retrieved 832 records, the vast majority of which 
are classified as “restricted by law.”  Thus, the problem of access to primary source material had to 
be confronted. The chemical warfare activities carried out in Canada were jointly prosecuted by the 
United Kingdom and Canada from 1940 and with the United States after Pearl Harbor. Chemical 
warfare records of this period are available at the National Archives of the United Kingdom (NA 
(UK)) and the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) in the United States. The U. 
K. Archive WO188/812 (Minutes of Canadian Chemical Warfare Committee, Chemical Warfare 
Laboratories Advisory Committee and the Inter-service Working Committee on Chemical Warfare) 
and WO188/702 (Co-ordination of Research into Chemical Warfare between Britain, Canada and 
USA) are open. These records are a copy of the equivalent documents in the Canadian Chemical 
Warfare files. At NARA, in Record Group 175, the records of the CWS of the U. S. are also open, 
and were accessed by the author to obtain copies of much of the Canadian work on chemical warfare 
during the Second World War.  
 The preparations of Canada to wage a chemical war against both Nazi Germany and Imperial 
Japan, as part of a coalition during the Second World War, represents a largely unexplored area of 
Canadian military history. And yet, chemical warfare preparations were one of the Canadian 
contributions to the Second World War which were probably used by the Mackenzie King 
government as another means of reducing the risk of conscription that would result if large numbers 
of Canadian men were called upon for the land war. The Suffield Experimental Station was a major 
asset of the Allies, and a major Canadian war contribution. Canadian volunteers played a 
distinguished, and largely unknown, part in the testing of the chemical weapons of the Allied 
coalition which waged a bitter war in two major theatres of military action from 1939 to 1945. In the 
closing stages of the war in the Pacific, the coalition forces, dominated by the United States, but 
including Canada, contemplated unleashing a chemical war against the Japanese, especially during 
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the planned invasion of the Japanese home islands, in order to reduce Allied casualties. This chemical 
war mercifully was never fought. 
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     Chapter 2 
  Canadian Chemical Warfare Preparations to December 1941. 
 
I think I may claim to be responsible in no small measure for the unity of 
Canada at this time and certainly for the united manner in which the 
country has entered the war at the side of Britain.  
  Prime Minister Mackenzie King, in his diary, December 31 1939.  
 
Of course, I considered your treaties (just between us) so much toilet paper- 
  Hermann Goering to Gustave Gilbert, at Nuremberg, 1946, in   
                Nuremberg Evil on Trial, by James Owen. 
 
The appalling cost of the First World War, with nearly 60,000 Canadians dead and another 
173,000 wounded, left Canadians wary of further international involvement. Liberal Prime Minister 
Mackenzie King's general principle with respect to external affairs was that Canada should play a 
gradually more autonomous role, while avoiding unnecessary international commitments. King was 
an admirer of Great Britain and always assumed that, in the case of a major war, Canada would 
support Britain. But in less serious circumstances, he felt that Canada should be more independent, 
and in all cases, he felt that the Canadian Parliament should make the decisions. In 1927, when 
Canada was elected to a non-permanent seat on the Council of the League of Nations, King was 
suspicious, fearing this might lead to unnecessary commitments. Although not confined to Quebec, 
isolationism was strongest in that province which was embittered by the imposition of conscription 
for military service during the First World War.1 However in the late 1930s, the looming war in 
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Europe led to the realization in government circles that Canada would inevitably be drawn into 
another major conflict.  
 The Canadian government, headed by Liberal Prime Minister Mackenzie King, embarked 
upon the war with one supreme concern: that the war must not undermine national unity. King 
wanted a war of "limited liability", wherein Canada's principal contributions to the war effort would 
be economic and productive rather than military. This was a view shared by the Conservative 
opposition and its leader Dr. Robert Manion. Mackenzie King, recalling the conscription crisis of 
1917, was acutely sensitive to public opinion in French-speaking Québec where conscription was 
unpopular, and he feared the consequences for national unity -- and his party's chances for re-election 
-- should heavy ground casualties force his government to enact conscription for overseas service.2 
When Canada declared war on Germany on September 10 1939, Prime Minister King promised the 
country -- though in essence it was a pledge to Quebec -- that there would be no conscription for 
overseas duty. There was, however, conscription for the defence of Canada. Mackenzie King and 
Ernest Lapointe,3 Canadian Minister of Justice, worked together to bring a united Canada into the 
looming war through a decision of the Canadian Parliament, while also satisfying the concerns of 
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Québec with regard to conscription. “French Canadians were willing to allow English Canadians to 
volunteer, so long as the threat of conscription no longer existed.”4 
 The government of Canada, somewhat like the British and French governments in late 1939 
and early 1940, was involved in a “phony war.”5 For Canada there had been no huge mobilization of 
military forces,6 material or financial resources. A plan had been made to train Commonwealth 
aircrew in Canada,7 but little else had been prepared or organized. In May 1940, Germany invaded 
France, the Wehrmacht striking between Belgium and the carefully prepared Maginot Line8 
defences, while using a superior tactical air power doctrine. After the fall of France in the spring of 
1940, Britain's strategic situation was not enviable. The British Expeditionary Force had left most of 
its guns and heavy equipment on the beaches of France after the Dunkirk evacuation.9 Following the 
French capitulation, Nazi forces were in control of most of Europe, and Britain was facing an 
invasion, with Canada its only ally in the North Atlantic. On July 3, the British surrounded the 
French fleet at the port of Mers-el-Kebir outside Oran, Algeria and destroyed the French fleet to 
                                                 
4
 Granatstein and Morton, p. 11 
 
5
 The Phoney War (also known as the Bore War, or German Sitzkrieg) , was a phase in the early second World War from 
September 1939 until May 1940 marked by few military operations in Continental Europe, in the months following the 
German invasion of Poland and preceding the Battle of France. The great powers of Europe had declared war on one 
another, yet neither side had committed to launching a significant attack, and there was relatively little fighting on the 
ground. The British Expeditionary Force landed in France, while British children were sent to Canada or the British 
countryside in anticipation of attack on Britain from the air using chemical weapons. 
 
6
 Canada's commitment to the British-French forces in Europe was limited to one division. 
 
7
 Granatstein and Morton, p. 10. An initial small training project had been agreed upon in April, 1939, but the war 
intervened before the arrival of the first trainees in Canada. Later the British Commonwealth Air Training Scheme grew 
in size to a huge organization administered by Canada. 
 
8
 For a fascinating virtual tour of the Maginot Line visit http://www.maginot-line.com/ The causes of the British and 
French military defeat are complex, and still a source of discussion for historians of that era. See J. Mosier, The Blitzkreig 
Myth, (New York 2003) for a recent and different analysis of the factors involved. 
 
9
 Of the 2,794 guns the BEF had brought to France, 2,472 were left there, along with 63,879 motor vehicles out of 66,818. 
These figures are taken from L. F. Ellis, War in France and Flanders (London 1953), p. 327. France surrendered June 22 
1940. 
 
  26  
 
prevent possible seizure by Germany.10 The world turned upside-down. Nazi leader Adolf Hitler fully 
expected the British to negotiate an end to resistance.11  
 As history records this did not happen. The autumn of 1940 was a daunting time for Britain. 
That summer the Battle of Britain had been narrowly won.12 But in aircraft and industrial output, 
Britain, alone in Europe against the Axis, remained in peril, its supply lines tenuous. The dominions 
and colonies could offer manpower, their under-utilized industrial capacity and money, but only 
within limits. Another problem was the need to adjust to the reality of a different kind of war, one 
requiring advanced technology, new techniques of war and new weapons. In the past Canada had 
looked to Britain for guidance and technical assistance. Now it was Britain which needed the help of 
its oldest dominion. Decisions and industrial organization were now required rather than the raising 
of huge armies, for which in any case there were few weapons. After the long struggle of the Great 
Depression of the 1930s, the challenges of the Second World War accelerated Canada's ongoing, but 
slow, transformation into a modern urban and industrialized nation. 
 In addition to military manpower, a modern war demands many other resources. During the 
Second World War, Canada contributed food supplies, financial aid, the British Commonwealth Air 
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by Prime Minister Winston Churchill, "The Battle of France is over. I expect the Battle of Britain is about to begin..." The 
Royal Canadian Air Force contributed a squadron during the Battle of Britain 
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Training Plan,13 ships, aircraft, tanks and eventually over a million Canadians to the Allied cause. 
Enemy prisoners of war found a secure location in camps in Canada.14 Approximately 16,000 
aircraft, including Lancaster and Mosquito bombers, were built in Canada. By the end of 1944, 
Canadian shipyards had launched naval ships, such as destroyers, frigates, corvettes, and some 345 
merchant vessels. The Royal Canadian Navy was tiny in 1939, but its expansion during the war was 
remarkable: it enlisted 99,688 men and some 6,500 women, and it manned 471 fighting vessels of 
various types. Its primary task was convoy, protecting the troop and supply ships across the Atlantic. 
It carried an increasing proportion of this burden, fighting grim battles sometimes of several days' 
duration with U-boat wolf packs. From 1939 to 1945 in combination with the Royal Navy it sank or 
shared in sinking four hundred and ninety-one enemy submarines.15 But perhaps no Canadian 
contribution to the Allied war effort was as vital as that made by the metals industries: half of Allied 
aluminium and ninety percent of Allied nickel was supplied from Canadian sources during the war.16 
These contributions to the cause of the Commonwealth probably all served the purpose of  allowing 
Mackenzie King to deflect British requests for more manpower, and hence limited the possibility of 
conscription of Canadians for overseas service. 
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 Granatstein and Morton p. 12. An initial small training project had been agreed upon in April, 1939, but the war 
intervened before the arrival of the first trainees in Canada. The new idea was to train 20-30,000 aircrews in Canada, 
following a suggestion of the Australian High Commissioner in London. After some consideration an angry Mackenzie 
King believed that this could have been used as the major Canadian contribution to the war if the British had made the 
proposal earlier, and would have made a Canadian expeditionary force, with all of the attendant political problems, 
unnecessary. It might also have reduced the anticipated financial burden for Canada of participating in the war. 
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 During the course of the Second World War Canadian scientists and engineers also 
contributed to the development of many weapon systems and military technologies. Among these 
may be noted radar, gun laying, proximity fuses, the new explosive RDX,17 biological and toxic 
warfare research, atomic research and chemical warfare preparations. Perhaps one of the least known 
to Canadians is chemical warfare preparation and testing.  British concern that German and Italian 
forces might use chemical weapons led the British Government to resume production of chemical 
weapons by 1937. In the years immediately prior to the start of the Second World War, Canada too 
was quite properly sensitive to the potential of chemical warfare should relations with Germany 
finally become hostile. Canadians were particularly apprehensive because Canadian troops had 
suffered during the first chemical attack with chlorine gas by the Germans at Ypres in 1915.18 
Certainly the attack would be recalled by those responsible for making decisions about Canadian 
military preparations for a possible future war with Germany. In 1939, at the beginning of the 
European phase of the Second World War, the Allies announced that they would honour the Geneva 
Protocol, while explicitly reserving the right to retaliate.19 The initial phase of a war is often 
definitional: it may establish implicit and explicit controls and prohibitions regarding the use of 
certain weapons and acceptable targets.20 In announcing that they would respect the Geneva Protocol, 
the Allies made a conditional pledge based upon mutual restraint. It was clear that initiation by either 
side would lead to retaliation.  
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 RDX [Research Department Explosive] was first prepared in 1899. Its explosive properties were not appreciated until 
1920. RDX was used widely during World War II because petroleum was not needed as a raw ingredient. 
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 Gas, however, was one of the few effective defensive weapons left to Britain should invasion 
occur. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill had ordered that production of chemical weapons be 
accelerated as a matter of urgency. But the stockpile of chemical weapons in Britain was only a total 
of 450 tons of mustard gas and 50 tons of phosgene, only about 3 days of supply under active war 
usage! Canada assured Britain that it would cooperate in every way possible to help with chemical 
warfare preparations.21 Given time to construct the required plants, Canada could manufacture 
respirators and charcoal, anti-gas ointment and clothing, along with war gases such as mustard gas 
and phosgene, to bolster the British supply. Canada also had huge, empty areas of land which could 
be used for chemical warfare experimental purposes. There were, however, many scientific, financial 
and engineering problems to be overcome. Canada had no production facilities for mustard gas, nor 
facilities for testing chemical weapons or charging munitions with gases. During the Great 
Depression there had been no extra money for the Canadian National Research Council which was 
responsible for the Canadian chemical warfare planning, nor had any more money been made 
available in Canada for research into war projects. 
  The need for coordinated efforts between Britain and Canada for defence purposes also 
enabled Canada to participate in the war by carrying out scientific research, which would not have 
happened otherwise. These collaborations set scientific research in Canada on a dramatic new 
path, which persisted for more than twenty-five years into the post-war era. That this became 
possible was due in large part to four individuals: C. J. Mackenzie,22 General A. G. L. 
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  Bryden, John, Deadly Allies, Canada’s Secret War 1937-47, (Toronto, Ontario, 1989), p. 61. 
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 Chalmers Jack Mackenzie, 10 July 1888-26 February 1984. Chalmers Jack Mackenzie, C.C., C.M.G., M.C., BE, MCE, 
D.Sc, Lt.D, F.R.S.C. was a Canadian civil engineer, Dean of the College of Engineering at the University of 
Saskatchewan, chancellor of Carleton University, president of the National Research Council, first president of Atomic 
Energy of Canada Limited and instrumental in the development of science and engineering education in Canada. See G. 
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McNaughton,23 Frederick Banting,24 and Otto Maass,25 all of whom had been strongly influenced 
by the trauma of the First World War. From 1935 through 1945 these four men were largely 
responsible for planning the Canadian government's scientific activities, under Cabinet War 
Committee (CWC) control. The formal and personal relationships that developed among these 
science administrators, and with Henry Tizard26 from the U. K. and Vannevar Bush27 in the U. S. 
A., made possible agreements and subsequent sharing of essential scientific information, though 
not without occasional problems.28 
 After the declaration of war, C. J. Mackenzie, acting on behalf of the King government asked 
Dr. Otto Maass, head of chemistry at McGill and a member of the National Research Council (NRC) 
governing council, to be responsible for establishing chemical warfare research,29 presumably for 
                                                 
23
 Andrew George Latta McNaughton, (February 25, 1887 - July 11, 1966) CH, CB, CMG, DSO, CD, PC was a Canadian 
army officer, politician and diplomat. In 1939 he led the Canadian army into the Second World War. The British generals 
frequently criticized him, and his support for voluntary enlistment rather than conscription led to conflict with James 
Ralston, the Minister of National Defence. McNaughton resigned his command in 1943. J. Swettenham, McNaughton, 3 
vols. (Toronto 1969). 
 
24
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Canadian self-protection. From his studies under Nernst30 in Germany immediately prior to the First 
World War, Maass had personal experience of German chemists, and good reason to respect their 
scientific abilities.  
 The question that needs to be asked, though, is why did the Canadian government even 
consider chemical warfare research when it was a signatory to the Geneva Protocol on chemical 
weapons? Surely this reduces to a question of trust in the word of a sovereign state. How much 
confidence could any government now have in the word of the Axis leaders? Mussolini had used 
chemical weapons against the Ethiopians, even though Italy was a signatory to the Geneva Protocol. 
And if the Nazis had breached so many other treaties on their road to dominance, why not one more? 
As Adolf Hitler stated: 
  I shall give a propagandist cause for starting the war, never mind whether it 
be true or not. The victor shall not be asked later on whether he told the truth or not. 
In starting and waging a war it is not right that matters but victory. Close your 
hearts to pity! Act brutally! Eighty million people must obtain what is their 
right...The stronger man is right...Be harsh and remorseless! Be steeled against all 
signs of compassion! 31 
 
 Canada was more than willing to become involved in chemical warfare research and 
production if it helped the Allied cause. While the Geneva Protocol allowed no first use, it did permit 
defensive preparations and retaliation against an attack with gas, and Canadian chemical warfare 
preparations were largely defensive in nature during the first few years of the war.  
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 Walter Nernst was a German chemist who is known for developing the concept of chemical affinity as embodied in the 
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 Active research in chemical warfare was being carried out in Canada as early as 1939 and was 
public knowledge at that time. As a December 1939 article in the Toronto Star reported: 
 A German-developed antidote to phosgene, poison gas used extensively in 
the last war, has been brought to Toronto by a German refugee scientist, it was 
learned here today. Forced to leave Germany, the refugee had been working in a 
Nazi laboratory and carried in his head the formula for the antidote which he and 
other German scientists had recently developed.  
 His arrival was welcomed in Toronto, since improvement of known methods 
of combating phosgene gas is one of the problems which the Banting laboratories 
have been carrying out as a part of their wartime duties.  Canada has been allotted a 
large proportion of war research by the British coordinating committee, headed by 
Sir Edward Mellanby, and the hunt for a better antidote to phosgene was one 
problem given to the Banting laboratories. 
 Now, with the aid of the latest German developments brought to this country 
by the refugee scientist, this particular problem is virtually completed. Anti-gas 
measures will also be studied in Montreal by Dr. I. N. Rabinovitch of McGill 
University, now in England with Sir Frederick Banting.32 
 
Thus, from this one press article, anyone who could read would know the identity of the Canadian 
scientists working on a Canadian chemical warfare programme, and the location of the research 
laboratories! If necessary the enemy would even know where to find Major Rabinovitch.  Clearly the 
British were in charge, probably due to a sense of being the head of the Commonwealth and having 
greater industrial capacity, while security was apparently non-existent at this point in time. This 
releasing of chemical warfare information through the press continued during the war. For example:  
    “Somewhere in England”, December 5, 1940. 
 
As part of the particularly thorough training the 2nd Canadian 
Division is receiving in protection against gas, a flight of Royal Canadian Air 
Force planes staged a "gas attack" against an entire brigade during a thirty-mile 
manoeuvre Two regiments from Western Quebec and one from the Prairie 
Provinces were slogging along narrow roads when planes dived on sections of 
the columns; spraying them with a harmless liquid which looked like “mustard” 
gas.33 
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 Toronto Daily Star, December 8 1939. The name of the German refugee scientist was not given. 
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One can only hope that this release was intentional and devised for the purpose of informing any 
enemy agents that the Canadian Army was well prepared for gas warfare! 34  
 Many of the practical problems associated with gas warfare which were raised during the First 
World War still needed to be studied in an organized scientific manner, since most of the efforts of 
the previous war had, by necessity, been of an empirical nature. One of the most important tasks was 
to improve respiratory protection, particularly against toxic smokes,35 which had been a feature of 
chemical warfare in the last year of the First World War. Little was known of the properties and 
behaviour of particulate clouds and of methods which might be used to remove them from the inhaled 
air. Towards the end of the First World War, activated charcoal was normally used as an adsorbent in 
place of the reactive chemical fillings which had been used in the early years.36 The first supplies of 
respirator charcoal were made from carbonized coconut shells, but it was feared that in another major 
war the demand for charcoal could not be met from this imported raw material, which might also be 
interdicted by an enemy, and so the use of alternative sources of charcoal, such as wood, peat, coal 
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 On a more speculative note, perhaps these releases of information regarding chemical weapons were part of one of 
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and coke, was examined. Eventually a process was developed using coke and this was used from 
1923 for making very large quantities of high-grade charcoal for respirator containers.37 
 In the event of war, activated charcoal required for Canadian containers was supposed to be 
imported from Britain. But before the war began, it became evident that Canada would not be able to 
rely on British supplies.38 Canada had to look at indigenous sources, including coal.39 Through 1938 
and 1939 E. A. Flood, a key figure in the Canadian chemical warfare programme,40 visited Canadian 
manufacturing plants, assessing the possibilities for producing not only a suitable form of charcoal, 
but also other components of the respirator, so that mass production of the respirators could begin. 
 The chemical warfare scientists faced further problems. First, it was necessary to study the 
properties of the more effective chemical agents that had been used during the First World War years 
so that more economical and safer methods of making them could be devised.41 Secondly, it was 
necessary to synthesize and test new compounds that might provide better and novel chemical 
warfare agents. Quite apart from any intention to use such chemical weapons offensively, this 
information was necessary to evaluate the threat from new chemical warfare agents and to develop 
adequate methods for defense. Perhaps one of the most important problems at this time was to 
provide protection against mustard gas. The introduction of mustard gas by the Germans in 1917 had 
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created many new problems. One of these was due to the fact that liquid mustard gas and its vapour 
can produce casualties by the absorption of the agent through the skin. In addition to protection for 
the respiratory tract it was clear that protection for the whole body was needed. Further, mustard gas, 
unlike the majority of chemical agents used in the First World War, was chemically stable and 
consequently could cause casualties long after deployment, constituting a hazard by giving off vapour 
and by contact as a liquid - even as a diluted liquid.42 Research focused on the detection of mustard 
gas on the terrain and military equipment, and on neutralization both on the body and on the ground. 
For neutralizing mustard gas on the ground, bleaching powder43 was the reagent of choice, while to 
neutralize mustard on the skin Canadian chemists developed an ointment.44 Another approach to the 
problem of protecting the skin was to develop permeable clothing chemically treated to inactivate 
mustard gas.45 The disadvantages and discomforts of wearing impermeable oil-proofed clothing, and 
the consequent reduction of the efficiency of men wearing it, had become apparent during the First 
World War, when it was first employed as a protection against mustard gas. Investigations were 
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therefore made of the possibility of impregnating ordinary fabrics with chemicals which would react 
with vesicants before they could reach the body. Experimental work carried out along these lines 
during the period between the wars led to several effective processes being evolved. In one, 
developed in Britain, clothing was impregnated with a chemical known by the code name of “Anti-
verm”, which was capable of neutralising the effects of mustard gas.46 
 In the fall of 1940 British, Canadian--and American-- scientists agreed to exchange chemical 
warfare information through the person of Maass, who became the representative of both the British 
and Canadian chemical warfare programmes.47 The choice of a Canadian scientist as the liaison 
between a belligerent Britain and a friendly but neutral United States was probably not accidental. 
 Canadian research in chemical warfare was inter-service in nature, with the Army taking the 
major share of administrative responsibility. In addition to the small respirator assembly plant which 
had operated in Ottawa before the war, the Research Establishment (Chemical Warfare) was 
established there in August 1941. Chemical warfare research and development was organized and 
coordinated by the Canadian Directorate of Chemical Warfare and Smoke (DCWS) in its own 
laboratories and in Canadian university laboratories. The Suffield Experimental Station, which was 
established in 1941, eventually became the centre of Canadian, British (and later American) field 
tests using mortars, artillery shells, bombs and spraying to deliver chemical agents on a large scale. 
Smoke and flame weapons were also developed and tested here, these latter weapons being used 
extensively by British and Canadian forces during the Second World War.  
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 During the Second World War the chemical munitions produced by the Allies contained the 
same agents used in the First World War. These comprised choking gases such as chlorine, phosgene 
and chloropicrin, as well as blood gases such as hydrogen cyanide and cyanogen chloride. The 
vesicant or blistering agents included variants of sulphur mustard gas and its derivatives nitrogen 
mustard and mustard-lewisite.48 All of these chemical weapons were produced, tested and stockpiled 
by Canada during the course of the Second World War. 
 The Cabinet War Committee (CWC) was the most important and active of the wartime 
committees of the Canadian Cabinet. Between the first and last meetings, the membership of the 
Committee altered several times, however the Prime Minister or acting Prime Minister, the Defence 
ministers, the ministers of Finance and Munitions and Supply were always members. The remaining 
members were among the most experienced ministers of the day. The first session (Meeting ‘A’) of 
the CWC took place on December 8 1939. Throughout the war the CWC would meet no less than 
349 times.49  
 On September 26 1940, just two months after the Dunkirk evacuation, the topic of chemical 
warfare first appears in the proceedings of the CWC. This was a financial commitment of 10-15,000 
dollars to make “…provision for a Canadian Chemical Warfare Defence Laboratory overseas.”50 The 
request for the laboratory had been made by General McNaughton, based on the assumption that the 
                                                 
48
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use of poison gas by the Nazis in an invasion of the British Isles was a strong possibility.51 He wanted 
approval for the laboratory within the “… next few days, so that Canadians will not be caught as they 
were at (the) second battle of Ypres.”52 By the beginning of 1941, gas warfare seemed to occupy a 
more definite place in the minds of those in charge of the government. The establishment of a 
Canadian Chemical Warfare Defence Laboratory at an estimated expenditure of $510,000 was 
approved by the CWC.53  
 The first meeting of the Canadian Chemical Warfare Committee took place on October 3 
1940 in the National Research Council (NRC) Building, Ottawa. This committee was originally 
tasked with the production of respirators, and was never intended to deal with the more extensive 
demands of a pending chemical war. Colonel G. P. Morrison of the Canadian Department of National 
Defence stressed the need for coordinating requirements for the three services, each of which could 
expect to be subjected to chemical attack, but under different circumstances.54 He pointed out that the 
following items were being supplied to all services: anti-gas capes; ointment; eye shields; detector 
paper;55 oilskin clothing for decontamination and a number of training stores. One suspects that most 
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plans to attack naval vessels with toxic gases, as well as aircraft! For a fascinating account of “The Effectiveness of 
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of these stores were left over from the First World War, and that little real attention had been given to 
the question of chemical warfare until now. But with the Nazi forces triumphant in Europe since the 
fall of France, Britain and Canada were ready to grasp at any weapon to stave off defeat. 
Subsequently the Chemical Warfare Committee underwent significant re-organization to enable it to 
focus on preparations to wage chemical war. 
 The second meeting of the Chemical Warfare Committee took place on November 27 1940, 
now under the chairmanship of Maass. An important new member of the committee was Mr. E. 
Llewellyn Davies, Superintendent of Experiments at Porton Experimental Station in England. Dr. 
Flood, a member of the Chemistry Division of the National Research Council and now a Captain in 
the Canadian Army, made reference to the minutes of a Chemical Board meeting in England56 in 
which it was suggested that the production of war gases in Canada be considered. After some 
discussion it was decided that Canada had the capability to make diphenylcyanarsine (DC),57 but the 
manufacturing and storage of this chemical agent in Canada was more problematic than for the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
persistent agents and produced a brilliant red colour.  The paint changed colour from green to red in the presence of any 
liquid vesicant. Subsequently, booklets of detector paper and crayons were also produced and widely issued. National 
Archives of the United Kingdom [hereafter NA (UK)] Home Office [hereafter HO] 186/1330 and War Office [hereafter 
WO] 188/1029. See Military Intelligence Division (Canada) Specification CS/791, May 22 1940 for the exact 
composition. The influence of sulphur on the colour of aza dyes was studied in 1922 by W. R. Waldron at John Hopkins 
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production of thiodiglycol.58 Canada could however manufacture thiodiglycol for preparing sulphur 
mustard and store it in safety. For a fifty ton a week plant, $200,000 to $250,000 was the estimated 
cost, although this was not an exact figure.59 This would cover basic machinery and installation. It 
was then suggested that if a thiodiglycol plant were to be considered, a one hundred ton a week plant 
would appear a more reasonable unit. Mr. Davies agreed with this suggestion and pointed out that 
fifty tons a week units were limited [the limit in size] in England in order to scatter the production 
capacity over a number of small units, thereby reducing air raid danger. A plant of this size could 
afford to be hit by a bomb without too much damage whereas a hit on a larger plant would be 
dangerous. But Canada was secure from air raids. It was moved by Captain Flood and seconded by 
Colonel Morrison that plans be put in hand immediately to obtain authority from the CWC for the 
erection of a thiodiglycol plant in accordance with Flood’s memorandum of November 5 1940.60 The 
motion was carried unanimously.  
 After agreeing on the placement of an order for the Canadian preparation of a small quantity 
of the gas diphenylcyanarsine (described in Flood’s memorandum as being for “educational 
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purposes”), the Chairman asked Mr. Davies to explain what was being done in Great Britain to 
prepare for a possible chemical warfare attack and what he was seeking from Canada. 
 Mr. Davies said that British defensive equipment was well advanced.61 Every civilian in 
England had been issued with a respirator. The best offensive advance made was in connection with 
aircraft spraying of mustard. They had used this at Porton, spraying mustard gas from 100 feet but 
using substitutes at heights up to 15,000 feet as the experimental field at Porton was only 7000 yards 
by 4000 yards. Military authorities had noted that “the risk of casualties (chiefly blindness) to 
personnel outside Porton” was too great to allow any trials with high-flying modern aircraft.62 
Experiments using aircraft at high altitudes had been carried out at the joint Franco-British 
experimental station and range in the Sahara at Beni Ounif.63 After the fall of France in 1940 the use 
of this range was lost. Davies explained that he had come to Canada to see if he could find a 
replacement experimental field.64 It would have to be 50 miles by 50 miles and free of inhabitants. He 
had been told that in Saskatchewan and Alberta an excellent experimental ground could be found65 
and that better data could be obtained if the ground could be sprayed with mustard from several 
different types of aeroplanes. Different types of gas could also be used and they could find out the 
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 NA (UK)., AVIA 15/1071. 
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 In what was then a metropolitan department of France, still known today as Algeria. The area was 300 kilometres south 
of Oran. 
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the station had tended to fall in peace.” See NA (UK) AVIA 22/1218, Chemical Defence Research Station, Porton, Wilts: 
re-organisation. Perhaps sending the Superintendent of Experiments to Canada would “kill two birds with one stone?” 
 
65
 The sites considered were: Tracadie (New Brunswick), Northern Quebec, Northern Ontario, Brandon (Manitoba) and 
Maple Creek (Saskatchewan). D. J. Goodspeed, A History of the Defence Research Board of Canada (Ottawa 1958), p. 
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dangers of these (especially arsine).66 Maass asked Davies if he considered spraying from aircraft 
important, and the Committee was told that “it was a vicious weapon.” But the official feeling in 
Great Britain regarding chemical warfare was that Britain would not use it until the Germans did.  
 A discussion of the staffing of the proposed experimental field, the quality of the landing 
ground and the necessary presence of water then followed. After discussion of the possibility of 
Canada manufacturing some articles rather than them all being manufactured in England, a motion 
by Commander Houghton (seconded by Captain Flood) was made that the Committee endorse the 
scheme for the proposed experimental field. The motion was carried unanimously.67 The 
establishment of an experimental field in Canada would be yet another contribution to the Canadian 
war effort. The establishment of the experimental station at Suffield, Alberta would later be deemed 
to be one of the most important Canadian contributions to the chemical warfare preparations of the 
North Atlantic alliance during the Second World War. 
 The Chairman then asked Dr. Flood to discuss current problems of a technical and supply 
nature. The remainder of the meeting was taken up with discussions about respirator containers, air 
filtration units and the charcoal required for manufacturing these devices. There was a desire on the 
part of the Canadian government to have some articles of chemical warfare equipment manufactured 
in Canada rather than in England. This was consistent with Canadian concerns at that time about 
minimizing the financial cost to Canada, or making yet another contribution that could perhaps be 
used in negotiations with Britain over the provision of more troops.  
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 Arsine gas (AsH3) has been investigated as a CW agent, but no battlefield use has been documented. During and prior 
to World War II, the British studied this agent and rejected its use in the field. They concluded that arsine was more than 
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the gas! WO 193/727 Arsenic Warfare: "Arthur gas.” In contrast, several arsine-derived organoarsenic compounds have 
been developed and used as CW agents, including lewisite (2-chlorovinyldichloroarsine), adamsite 
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 By the beginning of 1941, gas warfare seemed to occupy a more definite place in the minds of 
those in charge of the Canadian government. The establishment of a Canadian Chemical Warfare 
Defence Laboratory at an estimated expenditure of $510,000 was approved by the CWC.68 On 
January 24 1941 Mackenzie King “…referred to a recent telegram received from the Dominion 
Office which indicated that there was increasing evidence of Germany’s intention to use gas from the 
air, and in the event of an invasion.”69 At the same meeting of the CWC Mr. Ralston, the Minister of 
Finance, stated that during his visit to England the subject of the British securing a “… large tract of 
land for experimental purposes in connection with gas warfare”70 had been raised by United 
Kingdom officials. The British were particularly keen to investigate how mustard gas could be 
sprayed from aircraft, but the 7,000 acres at Porton had simply been too small and constricting. No 
request had been formulated in writing at that time, although some correspondence with the 
(Canadian) National Research Council had already taken place. The Prime Minister indicated that 
should a formal request be made then the Government should agree to a fifty-square-mile area at a 
cost of between 400,000 to 500,000 dollars. It may be assumed that the results of the second meeting 
of the Chemical Warfare Committee had been communicated to the CWC by now. This initial 
discussion was the beginning of the establishment of the Suffield Experimental Station.71  
 In earlier negotiations regarding the British Commonwealth Air Training Scheme King had 
observed that: “…with the concentration of Canadian energies on air training and air power and 
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therefore less pressure for a large army, there would also be less risk of agitation for conscription.”72  
Further, the development of the facilities would bring economic prosperity to Canada. The financing 
of the air training scheme had become an issue with the Canadian government probably because the 
cabinet leaders had become conditioned by the Great Depression, and few understood the massive 
expenditures required for modern warfare. In negotiations with the British, one of the conditions set 
by Prime Minister King for finalizing an agreement regarding air training was that a statement that 
the Air Training Plan had priority over all other military commitments by Canada. In spite of 
objections from Britain, King remained firm on his request for the priority statement, because it 
would help minimize the risk of conscription in Canada. These negotiations clearly demonstrate 
King’s resolute commitment to a policy of no conscription, and a determination that Canada would 
not pay more than a fair share of the costs. King also wanted Canada to benefit industrially from 
participation in this war.73 
 Surely by consenting to the establishment of a field research station in Canada, and sharing 
the costs fairly, the government of Canada was once more demonstrating support for Britain-without 
committing any more troops for a ground war? Further, and perhaps equally important, such co-
operation allowed Canada into the scientific and strategic planning establishments of Britain and, 
later, the United States.   
 Earlier, in December 1940, Maass and Porton’s Davies had agreed on the choice of Suffield 
due to its size, greater isolation and lower cost compared to the alternative sites.  The negotiations to 
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formalize the chemical warfare arrangements between Britain and Canada began on 17 December 
1940 and were finalized by 1 March 1941. Canadian Minister of Defence J. L. Ralston, High 
Commissioner for Canada Vincent Massey, Generals A. G. L. McNaughton and H. D. G. Crerar and 
Major I. Rabinowitch represented Canada, while Lord Weir, Director General of Chemical Defence, 
R. Kingan74 of the Ministry of Supply and his deputy, James Davidson Pratt75 represented Britain. 
The physical infrastructure such as residences, machine shops and laboratories needed to support the 
activities of the chemists, physicists and meteorologists had to be constructed.  
 It was at this point that Canada balked at the cost, especially when the federal treasury would 
be largely responsible for paying for the land, buildings, equipment and maintenance of the base. The 
Prime Minister confided to his diary on March 8 1941:  
I think all members of the War Committee were disgusted at the way the British 
came back with respect to our share of expenses on experimental chemical warfare 
leaving to Canada the cost of purchasing land, construction of building, and then 
only dividing the expenditure of maintenance, equipment, etc, this in the light of 
the fact that the whole business is for the United Kingdom – something that is most 
undesirable for us to be concerned with at all. The Cabinet were practically 
unanimous in sending back a reply which would let whoever sent the message see 
that we had resented their attitude. This it was proposed to do by refusing outright 
the suggestion that they had made and saying we did not feel we should be 
expected to meet more than 1/3 of the cost.76 
 
It is important to emphasize King’s words: “- something that is most undesirable for us to be 
concerned with at all.” According to the Prime Minister, the Canadian government did not really 
want to engage in chemical warfare, except in a dangerous military situation and for self-defence, and 
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only considered such preparations as a means of support for Britain and perhaps as a way to deflect 
British requests for more troops. Even then, though, Ottawa did not want to shoulder most of the 
costs. Eventually agreement was reached to share the costs equally. Perhaps at this stage in the war, 
when the Axis forces were so successful, money no longer mattered to the same extent as in 1939?77  
 Somewhat more than one thousand square miles of prairie in Alberta were eventually chosen 
to provide the required experimental and training area. On April 9 1941 the Minister of National 
Defence submitted a draft order-in- council to the CWC providing for the lease of the land from the 
Alberta government. This draft order-in-council was passed at the same meeting and became P. C. 
2508/41. Later in 1941 the Canadian government expropriated the Alberta ranches and homesteads 
contained in the area known as the Suffield Block78 to be used for the joint Canada-United Kingdom 
chemical warfare experimental station. On June 11 1941 the Canadian Army became responsible for 
the administration of the ‘Suffield Experimental Station’ (SES) and within a short time Canadian 
scientists joined British scientists who were already present. Facilities such as laboratories, 
workshops, barracks and offices were built and several “…railway carloads of gases and artillery 
shells arrived from the United Kingdom…”79 Although the intention was to run Suffield as a 
chemical warfare experimental station, a chemical warfare centre and storage depots were added in 
the course of time.80  
 One of the main advantages of the site was the extremes of cold and hot weather. The 
scientists could test the effects of gases on humans and equipment in freezing temperatures. In 
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conjunction with their work in India and Australia, Porton scientists were thus able to conduct trials 
over a very wide range of temperatures and humidity during the course of the war.  
 Porton officials were able to direct Suffield to carry out any specific experiments they 
proposed, since they were paying half of the costs of the establishment. Suffield was run essentially 
as a British establishment with Davies receiving direction as much from London as Ottawa, often 
dealing directly with his colleagues at Porton or the British Ministry of Supply. As a result, the 
British were free to do whatever human trials in Canada they chose “short of causing death”, one 
author has observed.81  
 Canadian chemical warfare policy was initially restricted to a defensive programme of 
development, procurement and training, with each service being responsible for its own defensive 
training arrangements. This policy was changed in April 1941 probably due to the depressing outlook 
on the various war fronts, and the new possibilities which Suffield provided for Canadian chemical 
warfare preparations. In August 1941 two chemical warfare experimental establishments were 
authorized (P.C. 1/6687 of August 26 1941) and the Directorate of Chemical Warfare was established 
for their administration. Later in the same year the Directorate also assumed responsibility for design 
and research on flamethrowers and flamethrower fuels, previously a duty of the Directorate of 
Engineering Design. The other components of the chemical warfare organization comprised: the 
Canadian Chemical Warfare Inter Service Board (CCWISB) under the Chairmanship of the Director 
of Chemical Warfare with representatives from the three Services Staffs, the National Research 
Council and the United Kingdom; the field experimental station at Suffield, and the Chemical 
Warfare Laboratory (CWL) in Ottawa. Within this structure provision was made to promote 
collaboration between the three armed services. The CCWISB was the authoritative advisory body on 
all matters pertaining to chemical warfare. The chairman of the CCWISB was Otto Maass, who was 
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the director of chemical warfare and the official means of communication between the three services 
regarding all matters of chemical warfare, other than matters of the highest policy. These matters 
would be resolved between the U. K. and Canadian (and later U.S.) governments.  
 The laboratories and personnel at the National Research Council were taken over by the 
Department of National Defence in August 1941 to form the nucleus of the Research Establishment 
(Chemical Warfare)82, later designated Chemical Warfare Laboratories.83 Although vacancies on the 
establishment could in principle be filled by Navy, Army, Air Force or civilian personnel, in actual 
fact almost all the staff were members of the Army with no Navy and only one Air Force officer on 
strength. A few appointments were filled by civilians. Several technicians were drawn from the 
Canadian Women's Army Corps. Perhaps the most important contribution of the Chemical Warfare 
Laboratories was in the technical assistance given to Canadian industry in the manufacture of 
chemical warfare offensive and defensive equipment and in the critical examination of such 
equipment. In addition it carried out extensive development work on anti-gas equipment. A pilot 
plant was operated for the production of special chemicals required for chemical warfare purposes, 
including toxic gases. The Chemical Warfare Laboratories maintained a central information service 
on Chemical Warfare and related subjects, some 30,000 technical documents having been filed and 
indexed there.84 
 It had been clear to Canadian military planners well before the outbreak of war, that any 
direct military threat to the North American continent could only be confronted in cooperation with 
the United States. During the summer of 1938 American President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime 
Minister King of Canada had made public speeches regarding the two countries’ military relations. 
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On August 18 1938 at Kingston, Mr. Roosevelt declared that the United States would “not stand idly 
by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened.”85 In June 1940, American President Franklin 
Roosevelt had created the National Defense Research Committee (NDRC),86 an emergency agency 
of the Council of National Defence, with instructions to "correlate and support scientific research on 
the mechanisms and devices of warfare ..." in all areas except aviation. The leader of the new office 
was Vannevar Bush, President of the Carnegie Institution, formerly Vice President of MIT, and a 
close associate of the most influential scientists in the United States. 
It was during the period of the 'phony war'.  We were agreed that the war was 
bound to break out into an intense struggle, that America was sure to get into it in 
one way or another sooner or later, that it would be a highly technical struggle, that 
we were by no means prepared in this regard, and finally and most importantly, that 
the military system as it existed, would never fully produce the new 
instrumentalities which we would certainly need.87  
 
Unlike today, the United States was not prepared for war. It too was a victim of the Depression.88 
Consequently, little money had been spent on military research, while the military research that was 
done was carried out by military personnel and was often duplicated between the different branches. 
The military also tended to look down on engineers and scientists.89 NDRC committees needed 
                                                 
85
 C. P. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, (Ottawa, 1970), p. 97. 
 
86
 This was one of President Roosevelt’s most far-reaching decisions which gave the U.S. an 18 month head start in 
mobilizing science for the war effort. 
 
87
 Through his efforts and those of friends Compton, Frank Jewett and James B. Conant, President Franklin Roosevelt 
appointed Bush chairman of the National Defense Research Committee (NDRC) on June 27 1940 that promoted 
government sponsorship of private research. In 1942 the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) 
absorbed the NDRC and directly sponsored the development of a wide variety of scientific developments, from 
microwave radar to DDT, during the Second World War. 
 
88
  See G. D. Best, Pride, Prejudice, and Politics: Roosevelt Versus Recovery, 1933-1938, (New York, 1991) for an 
account of the U. S. Depression years and President Roosevelt’s New Deal. The American military-industrial interaction 
was established during the Second World War. See also http://lcweb2.loc.gov/fsowhome.html for a Library of Congress 
photographic collection of Depression images of America before the Second World War. 
 
89
 This same antipathy to scientists was found in the British Army of 1914-1918. In the words of Sir Lawrence Bragg: 
“There was an almost impassable barrier between the military and the scientific minds. The military thought us scientists 
far too visionary and gadgety to be of any help in the field; the scientists could not understand why their brain waves 
which seemed to them such war-winners, made no appeal to the military mind.” 
 
  50  
 
details of aircraft armaments, gun sights, air defence radar, asdic (sonar), chemical warfare, jet 
engines, anti-aircraft gun laying, acoustic mines and torpedoes, proximity fuses. The best source of 
such information was an embattled Britain which had already started development of these 
technologies.  
 In 1939 and again in early 1940, following discussions between the British Air Ministry and 
the Royal Society of London, Arthur Hill, Secretary of the Royal Society, had visited Washington as 
the representative of Sir Henry Tizard's secret radar committee.90 There, he gained the impression 
that if the British proposed a complete sharing of information, the Americans would respond in kind. 
This visit paved the way, in Tizard's words, for "bringing American scientists into the war before 
their government."91 As America was not at war, arrangements were made through Canada. In July, 
following Hill's report to the Royal Society, Tizard insisted on the creation of a permanent liaison 
network. The British Government sent to Ottawa, as chief British scientific liaison for all North 
America, Ralph Howard Fowler, F. R. S.92 Due to its proximity to the United States, and the 
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resulting ease of sharing information between Britain and the U. S., Canada enjoyed a far closer 
relation to Britain during the war than did Australia.93 
 Canadian cooperation with the United States had started at an early stage of the war, even 
before Pearl Harbor and the U. S. entry into the war. The American liaison was a result of the 1940 
Ogdensburg Agreement which established the Permanent Joint Board on Defence. The agreement 
authorized the exchange of liaison officers on chemical warfare and after 1941 led to “…the pooling 
of information…”94  A liaison officer from the United States Army Chemical Warfare Service came 
to be stationed permanently at Suffield after it was established, and the Canadian Army had a liaison 
officer stationed permanently at Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland, during the war.95 
 During 1941, Canadian chemical warfare activities focussed on the establishment and staffing 
of the Anglo-Canadian testing ground at Suffield, Alberta. The majority of the scientists, technical 
assistants, laboratory assistants and support staff were Canadians, while some administrative 
positions were held by British scientists. For example, Davies was appointed superintendent of the 
station, probably due to his extensive experience with chemical warfare while Superintendent of 
Experiments at Porton in England. Perhaps the much greater experience of the British in matters of 
chemical warfare could also have played a part in this appointment. The station also required a staff 
of fifty-four Army and forty-eight Royal Canadian Air Force members.96 In 1941, the federal 
government expropriated the Suffield Block, purchasing the majority of the land from the Canadian 
                                                 
93
 D ea n (of the University of Saskatchewan) Mackenzie, President of the Canadian NRC, viewed the twenty-eight 
months between the invasion of Poland and Pearl Harbor as critical to Canada's scientific and industrial development. 
Sharing Britain's sophisticated and secret weaponry, ahead of the United States, gave Canada an edge it had never before 
(or since) enjoyed. See M. W. Thistle, ed., The Mackenzie-McNaughton Wartime Letters (Toronto p. 151). 
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 R.  Ranger, “The Canadian Contribution to the Control of Chemical and Biological Warfare”, Wellesley Paper 5/1976, 
Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1976, p. 21. 
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 D. J. Goodspeed, A History of the Defence Research Board of Canada (Ottawa 1958), p. 138. 
 
96
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Pacific Railway and the Hudson's Bay Company, and displacing 452 residents. Experimental Station 
Suffield commenced operations on June 11 1941.97 Arrangements were made with the Canadian 
Pacific Railway to build a spur line to the experimental station and to supply water from its sources 
in the town of Suffield, while the Alberta government constructed an all-weather road to the station 
and established telephone service.98  
 The coordination of American-British-Canadian chemical warfare planning before the United 
States entered the war was one of the more demanding tasks confronting Maass during 1941. There 
were complaints from the American Chemical Warfare Service (CWS) regarding what they saw as: 
 Poor cooperation from the Canadians... These problems were soon rectified: there 
was an immediate improvement in the volume of chemical warfare reports and 
equipment moving across the border, and a representative of the CWS was 
appointed to Suffield.99  
 
In all probability these were nothing more than the inevitable teething problems associated with the 
establishment of a complex - and international - operation. Further, the military of the different 
countries had different operational protocols; an American “get things done” philosophy versus a 
British “proper way to do things”? Canadian chemical warfare representatives were sent to American 
chemical warfare establishments to observe the operation of these plants. One result of this 
collaboration was the establishment of a plant at Cornwall in Ontario for the synthesis of mustard 
gas100 using technical assistance and equipment from the American CWS. This plant became 
operational in 1942 and was able to supply both HT mustard and phosgene in tonnage quantities.101 
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 LAC microfilm reel C-5003. 
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 See LAC microfilm reel C-5003. 
 
99
 D. Avery, The Science of War: Canadian Scientists and  Allied Military Technology During the Second World War, 
(Toronto 1998), p. 133. 
 
100
 In his memorandum regarding the production of war gases in Canada, Flood suggests an order be placed for 5 tons of 
mustard gas suitable for aircraft spray (HT-V, C.S. 1324). “HT” is often called sulphur mustard even though it is a 
mixture of 60% HD (distilled mustard), less than 40% Agent T (bis [2-(2-chloroethylthio) ethyl] ether, and a variety of 
sulphur contaminants and impurities, usually poly-sulphides and dissolved iron in the form of a complex. The poly-
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 Collaboration between the United States of America, Britain and Canada on matters of 
chemical warfare probably surpassed that in any other field of defence during the course of the war. 
Guided by scientific training and driven by the mutual enthusiasm of practical scientists, engineers 
and servicemen working in a common purpose, all three countries worked together to perform 
numerous experiments and field tests. One project was to combine: 
true gases and aerosols or particulates, since in order to use toxic aerosols 
effectively, it was crucial to know the most effective size of particle for penetrating 
the enemy’s respirators… and the amount of dosage which would be required to be 
lethal… and the technique for laying down such an effective dosage.102 
 
 On the morning of December 7 1941 Japanese carrier-based aircraft attacked the American 
fleet at Pearl Harbor, resulting in the U. S. Congress authorizing war on December 8 1941. On 
December 11 1941 the German Charge d'Affaires, Dr. Hans Thomsen, said that Germany considered 
itself in a state of war with the United States. America, Britain and Canada were allies in the fullest 
sense, and were now able to work together openly in chemical warfare preparations. On December 
29 1941 the Directorate of Chemical Warfare warned that “since the possibility of the outbreak of 
chemical warfare in the Pacific sphere of operations would seem very likely… there is every chance 
                                                                                                                                                                    
sulphides, present to about 30% in production Levinstein mustard were known to be non-vesicant, while some thickening 
agents were known to be influenced by the presence of dissolved iron. Thus purification of Levinstein mustard was to be 
one of the objectives of Canadian chemical warfare research in the next few years. Both the Levinstein and the 
thiodiglycol processes were used in the Canadian mustard production programme. For a discussion of the composition of 
the Levinstein mustard and the nature of the polysulphide contaminant see The Polysulfides in Levinstein Process 
Mustard Gas, Science, New Series, v. 106, n. 2755, October 17 1947, pp. 355-359. 
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(Toronto 1998), p. 133. Some toxic chemical warfare agents were not gases at ordinary temperatures. For example, some 
arsenical "gases" were in the form of liquids which could be dispersed as particulate clouds with droplets ranging in size 
from 0.1 to 10 microns by spraying or by ejection from a high explosive shell. The ability of particles to penetrate the 
filter of a respirator depended, in a complicated way, on a number of factors; it varied with their size and was at a 
maximum for particles about 0.5 microns in diameter. In other words, particles smaller or larger than this were more 
readily caught on the filter. In order to make the conditions under which respirators were tested as exacting as possible, it 
was essential to keep the particle size of all testing clouds close to the maximum penetrative power. 1 micron = 1 x 10-6 
meter. 
 
  54  
 
that it would spread to other zones.”103 Given the known use of chemical weapons by the Imperial 
Japanese Army against the Chinese 104 this concern with chemical warfare was fully justified:  
It is definitely confirmed that in recent operations in Malaya, the Japanese used 
tear gas to cover a withdrawal when confronted by a strong Australian counter 
attack on January 28-29 1942. The American Military Mission in Chungking, 
China stated that the use by the Japanese of mustard gas and Lewisite against the 
Chinese in recent months is confirmed. It is reliably reported that the Japanese are 
now equipped with frangible type gas grenades filled with hydrocyanic acid, most 
likely for use against tanks. The Sumitomo Chemical Company at Niihama has 
been manufacturing arsenical war gases for the Japanese Army since June 1940. 
At Himeji, Japan there is a large factory including four special buildings for filling 
gas shells. 105 
 
 
A request by Great Britain to the Japanese Government that neither power use toxic gases in the war 
did not receive a satisfactory reply.106 In addition to the use of chemical weapons by the Japanese 
Army, a further factor in the probability of chemical warfare breaking out in the Pacific was the non-
adherence of the United States to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. 
 Chemical warfare in the Far East, if it did break out, would be fought in an entirely different 
environment from Europe. The war in the Far East was mainly in tropical forest where the 
atmosphere was hot and humid. The Allies lacked any data on how mustard gas – and other toxins – 
would behave in such hot, humid forests, all previous experience with chemical warfare having been 
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 LAC, HQS 4354-1-8 microfilm reel C-5002, Chemical Warfare - General - Policy - Offensive (See also HQS 4354-20-
1 Reel C-5007) 1941-42. 
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 Unit 731was a covert biological and chemical warfare research and development unit of the Imperial Japanese Army 
that undertook human experimentation during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) and World War II. It was 
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derived from temperate France during the First World War. It was assumed by scientists at Porton 
that mustard gas would probably behave the same in all climates. Later research using human testing 
would demonstrate that the effectiveness of mustard gas was increased tremendously by tropical 
conditions, due to the enhanced vapour formation under tropical conditions. Mustard vapour is a 
singularly effective casualty agent.107 One task of Canadian chemical warfare scientists from 1942 
onward was to help to obtain data about the behaviour of mustard gas and vapour under tropical 
conditions. 
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 NARA, CWS memorandum to Joint Committee on New Weapons, December 6 1943. 
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              Chapter 3 
 
             “Of Deaths Put on by Cunning and Forced Cause.” 
  Chemical Warfare Preparation and Its Consequences, 1942-45 
 
let me speak to the yet unknowing world 
How these things came about: so shall you hear 
Of carnal, bloody, and unnatural acts, 
Of accidental judgements, casual slaughters, 
Of deaths put on by cunning and forced cause, 
 
Horatio’s speech in the last act of Hamlet. 
 
  
 After the Japanese entry into the war in December 1941, the Atlantic alliance of America, 
Britain and Canada1 had two enemies to fight and two widely different environments in which to 
prepare to wage chemical war. Canada not only wished to assist Britain in the event of a German 
invasion or chemical attack, but also had an enemy of its own to defend against on the Pacific coast. 
The year 1942 saw the Canadian Army expand to its peak during the war. Japan's entry into the war 
also caused the expansion of home defence formations. Additional units were mobilized for coast 
defence along with three home defence divisions. Throughout the early months of 1942 the Cabinet 
War Committee and the Canadian Chiefs of Staff also had to reassess the Canadian chemical warfare 
policy. It was decided that the Directorate of Chemical Warfare and Smoke2 (DCWS) would 
coordinate the industrial scale production of chemical warfare agents, concentrating on mustard gas. 
                                                 
1
 The Allies of the Second World War were the countries officially opposed to the Axis powers during the Second World 
War. Within the ranks of the Allied powers, the British Empire, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United 
States of America were known as "The Big Three.”  
 
2
 It became too difficult to operate a full-scale military program within the National Research Council (NRC). To 
facilitate the operation, the Army created the Directorate of Chemical Warfare and Smoke (DCWS) in 1941. This 
directorate took over responsibility of the activities of the NRC Associate Committee on Container Proofing and 
Research, the body that had been directing the chemical warfare program since before the war. 
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The intention was that Canadian forces should have sufficient chemical weapons to launch retaliatory 
attacks in either the European or Pacific theatres of war.3 Provision was also made to provide all 
Canadian forces with protective equipment and respirators.4  
 In early 1942 the Canadian national policy regarding chemical warfare was still one of strict 
retaliation - no first use. But based on the experience of the First World War, effective chemical 
warfare retaliation had to be initiated virtually as soon as the enemy used this weapon. There was also 
the question of whether a gas attack against Canadians was to be construed to mean gas attack against 
Canadian servicemen anywhere, or attack against the Canadian homeland itself? On January 7 1942, 
the Canadian Chemical Warfare Inter Services Board (CCWISB) proposed the following policy: 
In view of the information contained in present Intelligence reports, there seems 
to be likelihood that chemical warfare will be used. As insurance against this 
contingency, and so we may be in a position to retaliate, the Board recommends 
that the manufacture of chemical warfare agents be initiated in Canada and 
particularly the manufacture of mustard gas…..the Board further recommends 
that equipment for charging chemical warfare projectiles and other weapons be 
obtained and installed for operations of a charging plant on a small scale in 
Canada.5 
 
After due consideration and discussion, the proposed CCWISB policy was adopted as Canadian 
national policy by the Canadian government. This policy only allowed the construction of plants for 
the production of chemical warfare agents, and the machinery for the charging of munitions. There 
was no mention of deployment of any chemical weapons on Canadian soil or overseas. Subsequently, 
Inter-Services Staff discussions were held at Suffield on March 21 and 22 1942 resulting in 
recommendations to the Chief of the General Staff regarding the fact that the use of poison gas by 
Japan against China had been confirmed and that chemical warfare action was believed imminent. 
                                                 
3
 Library and Archives Canada, [hereafter LAC] microfilm reels C-5012 and 5013 Chemical Warfare-Offensive weapons. 
 
4
 LAC Head Quarters Section [hereafter HQS] 4354-5-2 microfilm reel C-5003 Chemical Warfare - Miscellaneous anti-
gas stores - Impregnated clothing (See also HQS 4354-23-3-1 Reel C-5009).  
 
5
 LAC Chemical Warfare - General – Most secret policy 1943-1945, HQS 4354-20-1, 1 April 1944, Part 1, paragraph 4.  
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The Staff discussions led to the conclusion that a Canadian chemical warfare policy based on 
offensive action was now required “…to provide realism in chemical warfare plans, procurement and 
training.”6 On June 11 1942 the Minister of National Defence submitted proposals intended to 
increase the production of war gases, build additional storage facilities for the chemical agents and 
assemble the end-use chemical munitions. The new expenditures proposed totalled $12,397,500. 
These proposals were deferred until they had been examined by the Minister of Munitions and 
Supply.7 At the next meeting of the CWC, the Minister of National Defence, Mr. J. L. Ralston, stated 
that: “The Army Staff felt that Canada should be prepared to take the offensive in chemical warfare 
when the need arose.”8  He then proceeded to recommend a programme intended for Canadian needs, 
with the provision of chemical warfare reserves for the United Kingdom as a secondary objective.  
 For some members of Cabinet, the Minister of Finance Mr. Ilsley in particular, Canada was 
being drawn by its allies into a policy which did not serve the best interests of the country. Others 
believed that Canada should not resort to chemical warfare unless Canadians were attacked first. 
Prime Minister King agreed with Ilsley and felt that Canada should be prepared for chemical warfare, 
but the Canadian programme should not go beyond Canada’s own requirements.9 On June 12 1942 
the Minister of National Defence informed the Chief of the General Staff that his proposals for 
chemical warfare submitted on June 7-10 had been approved by the CWC with the “…proviso that it 
is only intended to provide for supplies for our own possible needs and not to provide reserves for 
export to other countries.”  
I opposed any expenditure of money for making this stuff to be used in the same 
way that we were making munitions to be sent abroad, but agreed to have materials 
                                                 
6
 Ibíd., Part I, Appendix II, paragraph 3. 
 
7
 LAC, C-5002, CWC meeting of 11 June 1942, paragraphs 22-24. 
 
8
 Ibíd., Meeting of 12 June 1942. 
 
9
 Ibíd., paragraphs 26-29. 
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supplied in case use of similar materials would be made against our people, as is 
possible on the Pacific coast and elsewhere.10 
 
 The new policy proposed “…the initiative in offensive chemical warfare action against any enemy 
move towards a possible attack in force against this Continent…”11 Offensive chemical warfare 
actions in the defence of Canada and contiguous territories were to be restricted by two 
considerations. One was that the strategic advantage for such action should be in favour of the Allies. 
The other was that consultations with the United Nations12 took place before a decision for use was 
taken.13 Chemical warfare was a “slippery slope” and Mackenzie King, while wanting Canada to 
help, did not want to become too deeply involved.  
 The potential for offensive chemical warfare was constrained by the availability of an 
adequate supply of chemical weapons, if they were to be used on a large and sustained scale. Thus 
any offensive use of chemical weapons demanded the production of sufficient stocks of chemical 
agents and their subsequent bulk storage near chemical weapon filling depots. The two Canadian 
filling depots were at Cornwall for eastern Canada and at Suffield for western Canada. It was 
believed that a reserve of some 10 kilotons of mustard gas could be created by December 11 1943, 
with 5 kilotons ready by December 1942.14 Stocks of phosgene, hydrogen cyanide and lachrymators 
were also required. Chlorine and adamsite (DM) were available on a small scale for training 
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 King Diary, June 12 1942, paragraph 3. 
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 LAC, C-5002, CWC meeting of 11 June 1942, paragraph 1. 
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 The term United Nations (“Here, where the sword united nations drew” from Byron's Childe Harold's Pilgrimage) was 
decided by Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill during World War II, to refer to the Allies. Its first formal use 
was in the January 1 1942 Declaration by the United Nations, which committed the Allies to the principles of the Atlantic 
Charter and pledged them not to seek a separate peace with the Axis powers. Thereafter, the Allies used the term "United 
Nations Fighting Forces" to refer to their alliance. 
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 Ibid., paragraph 2. 
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 Ibid., paragraph 7. 
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purposes. (Details of the industrial production of phosgene and mustard, the main war gases prepared 
during the Second World War, may be found in Appendix A.) 
 Of greater difficulty than the provision of chemical agents and the filling of munitions, was a 
political decision whether the Canadian forces should make a first strike with chemical weapons 
against a Japanese landing on the coast of British Columbia, in spite of the Canadian adherence to the 
1925 Geneva Protocol. There was a substantial basis for Canadian concern regarding the possibility 
of a landing and the need to resort to chemical weapons.15 The Japanese occupied the islands of Attu 
and Kiska16 in June 1942, a garrison which the Americans and Canadians had to eliminate before the 
Japanese tried to use the islands as a staging area for an assault on the coast of British Columbia. The 
Aleutians would be the site of the only land battles in North America in the Second World War. 
Fortunately, the remote location and the appalling weather made resupply of the Japanese garrison 
difficult, while the Americans and Canadians were able to send thousands of troops to attack the 
Japanese17 and remove what was seen as a threat to both Canada and the West coast of the United 
States.  
                                                 
15
 The Allies suffered many disastrous defeats in the first six months of the war. In January 1942, Japan invaded Burma, 
the Dutch East Indies, New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and they captured Manila, Kuala Lumpur and Rabaul. After 
being driven out of Malaya, Allied forces in Singapore attempted to resist the Japanese during the battle of Singapore but 
surrendered to the Japanese on February 15, 1942; about 130,000 Indian, British, Australian and Dutch personnel became 
prisoners of war. Japanese aircraft all but eliminated Allied air power in South-East Asia and were making attacks on 
northern Australia, beginning with a psychologically devastating (but militarily insignificant) attack on the city of Darwin 
on February 19, which killed at least 243 people. See H. A. Gailey, The War in the Pacific: From Pearl Harbor to Tokyo 
Bay, (New York 1995). Also T. Hall, Darwin 1942, Australia Darkest Hour, (London 1980). 
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 Kiska (Qisxa in Aleut) is an island in the Rat Islands group of the Aleutian Islands of Alaska located at 52.1° N, 177.6° 
E. It is about 22 miles (35 km) long and varies in width from 1.5 to 6 miles (2.4–9.7 km). 
 
17
 On August 15-16 1943, an invasion force consisting of 34,426 Allied troops, including 5,300 Canadians (the 6th and 
7th Infantry Divisions which landed on the 16th), 95 ships (including three battleships and a heavy cruiser), and 168 
aircraft landed on Kiska, only to find the island completely abandoned. The battle was significant in that large numbers of 
conscripts had been included in the 13th Canadian Brigade. The Japanese garrison of 5,183 troops had been evacuated 
from the island on July 23 under the cover of fog. Despite massive US air power, the evacuation went unnoticed. There 
were seventeen Americans and four Canadians killed from either friendly fire or booby traps, fifty more were wounded as 
a result of friendly fire or booby traps, and an additional 130 men came down with trench foot. The Japanese occupation 
of Attu and Kiska may have been a feint for the Midway operation, with little value other than the tactical goal of drawing 
the US Pacific Fleet into a major surface engagement. Historians J. Parshall, and A. Tully in their book Shattered Sword: 
The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway, ( Washington 2005) present an alternative interpretation. The military 
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 Using chemical weapons in retaliation against a German or Japanese gas attack had been 
official allied policy since early 1942. But American, British and Canadian chemical warfare planners 
were going further, and considering the use of chemical weapons in an offensive campaign in the 
Pacific theatre. Under the terms of the Geneva Protocol, the Allies could have initiated chemical 
warfare in the Pacific, arguing that it was in retaliation for the Japanese use of chemical weapons 
against the Chinese, who were now our allies. Thus an offensive chemical warfare policy against 
Japan would be justifiable under international law. 18 
 The guidelines for retaliatory attack were altered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCOS) on 
31 December 1942 with Canadian interests supposedly being subsumed as part of the British 
Commonwealth. The Canadian government not unreasonably raised objections to what was a 
bilateral decision by the U. S. and the U. K. and which had the potential to involve Canada in a 
chemical war without the Canadian government having given consideration or consent.19 Major-
General Pope,20 head of the Canadian Joint Staff Mission, criticized the CCOS decision:  
                                                                                                                                                                    
importance of this difficult-to-supply frozen island was questionable, but the psychological impact upon the Americans of 
losing U.S. territory was tangible. S. E.  Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II vol. 7 
Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls, June 1942-April 1944, (Illinois 2001). See also LAC microfilm reel T-17904 Kiska 
operations.  
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 In 1938, three years before the Pacific War with Japan began, Antony Eden (later  British foreign secretary and prime 
minister) was already emphasising the importance of  ‘effectively asserting white-race authority in the Far East'. The 
racial double standard in imperial politics was clearly demonstrated at the Versailles conference which followed the First 
World War in 1919. While the Americans and the British affirmed their commitment to the new movements for national 
self-determination in Europe, they rebuffed Japan's attempt to include a clause on racial equality in the covenant of the 
new League of Nations (M. Macmillan, Paris 1919, Six Months that Changed the World, (London 2001) p.95). The racial 
dimension made the Japanese a very different enemy from the Germans. The Japanese posed not just a military threat to 
the old imperial order, but a political challenge to white power that could encourage Asian nationalism. Hence racial 
factors were almost certainly involved in decisions regarding possible offensive chemical warfare and Japan. 
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Cabinet Office: British Joint Staff Mission and British Joint Services Mission: Washington Office Records, 22 July 1943. 
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 M. Pope, Soldiers and Politicians, (Toronto 1962).  For a fascinating analysis of politico-military matters which includes a short 
account of M. Pope and the Ottawa scene, see D. Morton,  Military Leadership and Change in the 1990's, XIII Annual CDA Institute 
Seminar. 
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Canada as a separate country21 having signed and ratified an international treaty 
prohibiting the use of gas as a method of warfare finds herself unable to express 
her adherence to this statement of policy as presently defined.22 
 
Perhaps this objection by Canada of exclusion from the decision-making process may have been a 
case of self-esteem by a young nation only recently independent. But perhaps not. Following the 
strong statement made by Prime Minister Churchill to Nazi Germany,23 and the equally strong 
warning issued by President Roosevelt to the Japanese,24 the Canadian Chiefs of Staff wanted Canada 
to “be in a position to employ gas as an offensive weapon immediately such a measure becomes 
necessary.”25 This request was not well received by the Canadian Cabinet War Committee (CWC). 
Major General J. C. Murchie however was insistent that chemical weapons be stored and ready to use 
against a possible Japanese invasion of British Columbia. Effective operational use of gas was 
believed to require at least forty eight hours warning so that Army, Naval and Air Forces would have 
time to prepare to attack enemy forces “by means of vesicant air spray….when he is seeking to 
                                                 
21
 Canada was an independent nation within the British Commonwealth of Nations by the Statute of Westminster 1931. 
The text of the document may be found at: http://www.gov.ns.ca/legislature/legc/westmins.htm 
 
22
 NA (UK) CAB 122/1323 British Joint Staff Mission and British Joint Services Mission: Washington Office Records 
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 “I wish now to make it plain that we shall treat the unprovoked use of poison gas against our Russian ally exactly as if 
it were used against ourselves, and, if we are satisfied that this new outrage has been committed by Hitler, we will use our 
great and growing air superiority in the west to carry gas warfare on the largest possible scale far and wide against 
military objectives in Germany.” Winston Churchill quoted in Time, May 18 1942. 
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 “From time to time since the present war began there have been reports that one or more of the Axis powers were 
seriously contemplating use of poisonous or noxious gases or other inhumane devices of warfare. I have been loath to 
believe that any Nation, even our present enemies, could or would be willing to loose upon mankind such terrible and 
inhumane weapons…. Use of such weapons has been outlawed by the general opinion of civilized mankind…I state 
categorically that we shall under no circumstances resort to the use of such weapons unless they are first used by our 
enemies. As President of the United States and as Commander in Chief of the American armed forces, I want to make 
clear beyond all doubt to any of our enemies contemplating a resort to such desperate and barbarous methods that acts of 
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United States itself and will be treated accordingly. …” Franklin D. Roosevelt, Statement Warning the Axis Against 
Using Poison Gas, June 8 1943, The American Presidency Project UC Santa Barbara.  
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General Staff, to R. L. Ralston, June 29 1942. 
 
  63  
 
consolidate beach head positions and before his main force has been tactically deployed.”26 The 
CWC was reluctant to accept Murchie’s proposal regarding immediate deployment of chemical 
weapons to the Pacific coast. It did, however, accept his recommendations that the demands of 
Suffield staff for equipment, materials and people be given the highest priority. Further, it was agreed 
that all three services use the offensive chemical warfare training facilities at Suffield.27 Canada was 
being drawn closer towards a chemical war.  
  It is likely that the CWC believed that if chemical weapons were actually deployed in a 
potential theatre of war, namely the west coast of Canada, it meant committing Canada to a chemical 
war. King recorded: 
There was further discussion on chemical warfare. Ilsley, St. Laurent and myself all 
strongly insisted on not permitting gas to be used by Canadians offensively until it 
was quite clear it had been used in that way by an enemy who might be attacking 
us. In other words, if the Japanese use it against China or the British, we would be 
free to use it in protecting ourselves and using it offensively if they attack Canada. 
On the other hand, it should not be used against the Japanese if they did not use it 
themselves, even should Hitler use it in Europe and Britain use it against Hitler. In 
other words, we insisted strongly that Canada on no grounds be made the occasion 
of resort to the use of gas; 28 
 
The retention of the chemical weapons at Suffield and Cornwall acted as a safeguard against 
escalation of the chemical war. The Canadian government and the CWC still had reservations about 
the use of chemical weapons, even at this difficult point in the war,29 not only due to Canadian 
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 After June 12 1942 the Chemical Warfare Centre at Suffield became known as the Advanced Chemical Warfare 
(Offensive) Training Centre.  
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 King Diary, Wednesday July 8 1942, paragraph 5. 
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 An extract from the report on the war situation for the period 19 February to 15 June 1942 submitted to the CWC by the 
Chiefs of Staff gives an idea of the repellent nature of the war news at that time: “Germany has successfully over-run the 
Kerch peninsula…opening the way into the Caucasus… The Libyan situation is somewhat confused…. Malta is under 
constant air attack… the submarine menace in the Western Atlantic has been successful to a degree which constitutes a 
serious threat to the Atlantic supply route…the fall of Singapore, the liquidation of the Dutch Indies, the invasion of 
Burma and the Japanese occupation of the Mandated Islands have placed Japan in a strong position…The Japanese have 
obtained a foothold in the Outer Aleutians. The war has moved closer to Canada on both coasts.” LAC, C-5002, HQS 
5199, June 15 1942, Chiefs of Staff Committee. 
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acceptance of the Geneva protocol, but also a genuine repugnance on the part of King and other 
members of the CWC. King’s diary is instructive; 
I was astonished to hear MacDonald say that he regarded gas simply as a weapon 
and saw no reason why it should not be used just the same as guns, shells or bombs. 
I pointed out there was a real difference; that the physical wounds resulting from 
metal and the like were capable of being healed and healed quickly, but that gas 
tended to occasion disease that would last for a long time and would spread in 
waves to innocent people away beyond that of other forms of destruction. 30 
 
Canada would not use these weapons, except as a last resort, and then only after due consideration by 
the CWC. King continued: 
I asked pointedly if it was not the case that the military authorities in our Defence 
Department had felt that our coast line was very large, full of inlets, and that B. C. 
itself full of defiles; that we had not the men to protect us and that the planting of 
gas bombs would be a substitute for manpower. I said that we should not allow the 
military authorities to take any action on their own; that the War Committee itself 
would have to be “satisfied” in the first instance that we were acting in accord with 
the United States in any resort to the use of gas and that we were in agreement with 
both the President and Churchill about its use in the right way at the right time if 
that became necessary. 31  
 
This approach could be regarded as analogous to that of governments in the late twentieth century 
retaining operational control of nuclear weapons. In most nuclear armed countries the use of nuclear 
force can only be authorized by the government.  
 An amendment to the CCOS statement was requested by Canada, requiring that 
Commonwealth governments involved in the use of chemical weapons give their consent before a 
retaliatory attack be launched. After extensive consultations between representatives of the three 
governments in Washington, the understanding reached was that: 
it was morally certain that the Commonwealth concerned would most certainly 
see eye to eye with the U. S. and British governments as to the necessity in any 
                                                                                                                                                                    
 
30
 King Diary, Wednesday July 8 1942, paragraph 5. 
 
31Ibid. The population of Canada in 1942 was 11,654,000. 
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given set of circumstances of resorting to gas warfare and would answer with the 
utmost promptitude any request put to them for their concurrence.32 
 
Canadian political sensitivities were apparently adequately addressed by this alteration to the CCOS 
statement. The wording gave ample scope for the Mackenzie King government to avoid a decision to 
allow deployment of chemical weapons on Canadian soil, and by implication give approval for their 
immediate use if Imperial Japanese forces were to land on the North American mainland.  This 
approach could probably be described as “masterful inactivity.” Or perhaps to paraphrase Mackenzie 
King, “chemical warfare if necessary, but not necessarily chemical warfare!” 
 Work began at Suffield Experimental Station to prepare Canadian troops for chemical warfare 
and to further develop chemical weapons. The recently created United States – Canadian Chemical 
Warfare Advisory Committee (US-CCWAC, which interestingly enough did not include the British 
in the title, even though E. L. Davies was a representative), provided a forum for coordinating gas 
storage and production between Canada and the United States. Perhaps the crucial Canadian interest 
was in ensuring that Canada received the consideration due an independent country. The major 
players were the British and Americans, each of whom was more vulnerable to chemical warfare 
than was Canada. Britain was in thrall to possible Nazi chemical attack on the home island, while 
American combat forces were exposed to possible chemical attack in the Pacific theatre of 
operations, if the Japanese used chemical weapons. A sustained chemical attack on Canada, 
however, was probably a military absurdity, given the vast and empty land area, and the limited 
range of existing enemy aircraft.33 
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 M. A. Pope, Soldiers and Politicians, (Toronto 1962), pp.182-208. 
 
33
 There were however a number of attempts to attack the U. S. and Canadian west coasts during the Second World War. 
See B. Webber, Silent Siege: Japanese Attacks Against North America in World War II, (Washington 1984) and R.C.  
Mikesh, Japan's World War II Balloon Bomb Attacks on North America, (Smithsonian 1973).  
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 The initial and most crucial meeting of the US-CCWAC was held on September 24 1943 at 
Edgewood, Maryland in the office of the Chief of the U. S.  Chemical Warfare Service, with Major 
General William N. Porter chairing the meeting. By this time significant U. S. resources had become 
available with which to develop chemical warfare materials.34 The Canadian representatives on the 
Committee were Dr. O. Maass, E. L. Davies of Porton and Suffield, Major J. C. Beeman of the 
Canadian Joint Staff (Army), Major J. Morris, representative of the Chemical Warfare Headquarters, 
and Lt. Colonel E. A. Flood. Significantly the American service was represented by a General 
Officer, while the senior Canadian officer was only a Lt.-Colonel. The industrial resources of the 
U.S. were of course far greater than those of Canada, and the amount of chemical warfare munitions 
available to the U. S. was vastly superior.35  
 The purpose of the meeting was to appoint technical subcommittees to assume responsibility 
for sixteen projects which included gas warfare and spray (Levinstein H purification and thickening 
                                                 
34
 The United States was probably fully occupied fighting the war in the Pacific before this time. Until the Battle of 
Midway June 4-5 1942, the Imperial Japanese forces enjoyed an unbroken string of success. On March 2-4 1943 the U. S. 
achieved victory in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea. The Aleutian Islands were occupied by U. S. and Canadian troops 
May 31 1943 while on November 20 1943 U. S. troops invaded Tarawa in the Gilbert Islands where they learned of the 
obdurate resistance of which the Japanese were capable using caves and tunnels. In the Far East the allies found that 
Japanese fortifications were resistant to anything except a direct hit from a bomb or large naval gun.  In one incident in 
1944, where 684 rounds of 3.7-inch howitzer shells and 670 rounds of 25-pdr shells landed in an area 250 yards square, 
the Japanese suffered only two confirmed dead and minor damage on a few communication bunkers; there was no 
material damage on the main combat bunkers (J. Ellis, The Sharp End of War: The fighting man in World War II, London 
1980). The allies found that individual guns fired at point blank range were much more effective - the trick was getting 
the guns in place! Increased American interest in chemical weapons for overcoming Japanese field fortifications dated 
from that time. 
 
35
 On June 9 1944 a U. S. study was undertaken “to determine whether or not gas should be used” in the invasion and “if 
so, when its use should be initiated.” At the time the study was made, the U. S. was producing poison gas at a prodigious 
rate. On hand by the end of 1945 were more than 4.4 million gas artillery shells, 1 million mortar rounds, 1.25 million 
aerial gas bombs, and 112,000 canisters for spraying gas from low-flying planes. T. B. Allen and N. Polmar, “Gassing 
Japan”, The Quarterly Journal of Military History, v. 10, n. 1, pp. 38-43. Details of the Japanese production of CW agents 
may be obtained at http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cgi-
bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/p4013coll8&CISOPTR=1581&filename=1570.pdf which accesses a declassified report 
of Japanese production techniques and production values. The total Japanese production of persistent agents from 1930 to 
1945 was only 4991 metric tons! Major –General K. Akiyama stated that “the Japanese not only feared recourse to gas 
but believed that it would be used on a large scale to hasten the end of the war. The Japanese, he explained, were 
particularly concerned lest the Americans spray their rice fields with mustard or lewisite or, worst of all, arsenic 
trichloride. Those tactics, he asserted, would have been as effective as dropping the atomic bomb.” Cited in E. M. Spiers, 
Chemical Warfare, (Illinois 1986). 
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of vesicants),36 gas masks, definition of vesicant casualties, smoke generation, protective ointments, 
and flame throwers. The committee as a whole was to consider the effects of terrain, specifically 
jungle and tropical conditions; methods of field sampling, and tests to determine the efficiency of 
chemical warfare gases and smokes under extremely cold conditions.37 After the island operations in 
the Pacific revealed the ferocity of the Japanese defences and the high human cost of overcoming 
them, U. S. military interest in chemical warfare increased, in spite of President Roosevelt having 
condemned the use of chemical weapons earlier. 
 Before 1939 practically all experimental work on gas warfare in the British Commonwealth 
had been carried out at the Chemical Defence Experimental Station at Porton, near Salisbury, 
England, apart from some experiments carried out in Rawalpindi in north-west India.38 Consequently 
relatively little had been known about the effects of war gases on the human body under tropical 
conditions. The startling discovery was made that under tropical conditions, mustard gas was at least 
four times as effective as it was in the temperate English climate. Sensitive areas of the human body39 
                                                 
36
 The purification of Levinstein mustard gas was one of the important responsibilities of the Canadian Directorate of 
Chemical Warfare and Smoke (DCWS). In an assessment of the purification of mustard gas for chemical warfare 
operations, Lt. Col. Flood provided the following suggestions for methods of treatment: addition of inhibitors (hexamine), 
vacuum distillation, flash distillation (developed by Dr. A. R. Gordon of the University of Toronto), steam distillation and 
solvent (pentane) extraction. The two most promising processes for improving Levinstein mustard were deemed to be 
steam distillation and solvent (pentane) extraction. Economics probably disposed of most of the remainder. As steam 
distillation of mustard also required a ceramic tower and packing, and a silver condenser to handle the corrosive mustard, 
one assumes that the Minister of Finance voted no! Purification was required to allow its use in medium or heavy-walled 
shell or bombs without elaborate anti-corrosion varnishing techniques, thus allowing tropical storage for up to 3 months 
for the charged weapon. Of course the mustard for service use must have the economical minimum of physiologically 
inert material!  
 
37
  LAC Chemical Warfare - Correspondence - United States-Canada Chemical Warfare Advisory Committee is currently 
restricted by law. The memoranda and minutes of the Advisory Committee were found in NA (UK) as WO 188/702, Co-
ordination of research into chemical warfare between Britain, Canada and USA.  
 
38
  NA (UK) WO 188/640 and 641, sub series within WO 188, Chemical Research Department, India, Periodical reports. 
 
39
 Injuries to the scrotum and penis were especially common and painful under conditions of high temperature and 
humidity.  Investigation, handling and dressing of the areas produced intense and crippling pain. General relief from 
prolonged pain and discomfort necessitated the use of morphia (1/4 grain under the tongue for 4 nights). Full details of the 
tests and results, including photographs of the soldiers tested may be found in Report No. 265 of the C. D. R. E. of India, 
retrieved from NARA RG 175, Box 154. It has been demonstrated that 80%  of sulphur mustard applied to the skin 
evaporates, 10% remains in the skin and 10% gets absorbed systemically (Renshaw, 1946). It can penetrate the skin by 
contact with either the liquid or vapour. The rate of penetration is proportional to dose, temperature and humidity. 
  68  
 
exposed for one minute to a concentration of mustard-gas vapour below 100 milligrams per cubic 
meter were seriously burnt. Such extreme sensitivity was associated with temperatures greater than 
90 degrees Fahrenheit and relative humidity greater than 80 per cent. Under these conditions 
comparatively small doses of mustard gas produced an unusually sudden onset of disability; skin 
burns developed more rapidly, with the result that men became casualties in a shorter time. 
Therapeutic agents for mustard gas were found to be virtually useless, unless applied at once, which 
would be almost impossible under battlefield conditions. Most anti-gas ointments fell into this 
category.40 It was found that the large amount of data accumulated in temperate zones would have to 
be checked and completely revised if vesicant gases were to be used in the tropics, and that much 
more research would be needed before chemical warfare could be undertaken in the tropics with any 
confidence. 
 While it is probable that an increased effectiveness of mustard gas in the tropics was 
anticipated by physiologists (though the full extent of its intensified action almost certainly was not), 
the discovery of the ease with which it was dispersed in the jungle apparently came as a complete 
surprise. Wind speeds at ground level in the jungle are usually only a small fraction of those 
immediately above the tree tops, but for a given ground wind speed in the jungle the rate of 
dispersion of mustard gas vapour was found to be several times greater than it would have been for 
the same ground wind speed in the open. These two factors combined to intensify the effectiveness of 
                                                                                                                                                                    
 
 
40
 United States-Canada Chemical Warfare Advisory Committee: Summary statement on Protective Ointments, NARA 
RG 175, Box 138. Extensive testing was carried at Edgewood Arsenal in the U.S.A. to develop protective ointments after 
July 1943, when Medical Research of the Office of Scientific Research stated that M-4 ointment containing 15% 
chloramine-T was not a suitable protecting agent. Impregnite S-330 was found to be far superior to any material tested at 
that time. The basic constituents of this prophylactic ointment were guanidine carbonate (or nitrate) and benzil. Lt.-Col. 
Flood, representing Canada presented a report by D. J. G. Malloch regarding the Canadian perspective on the use of anti-
gas ointment. “It is a cardinal point in Canadian policy that an effective ointment should be available at all times…the 
ointment would accordingly be required for the decontamination of many instruments, as well as for clothing and 
personal decontamination.” Further details of the performance and testing of the various ointments may be found in LAC 
HQS S. 4354-29-16-1. For work on protection against lewisite and other arsenicals carried out by Canadian scientists see 
L.Young, “Canadian Researches on BAL (British Anti-Lewisite)”, Science, New Series, v. 103, n. 2676, 1946, pp. 439-
440. 
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mustard gas in the jungle: for a given concentration it was more toxic, and for a given wind velocity 
it spread more rapidly. It was concluded that, under similar conditions in tropical areas, the degree of 
disability inflicted on occupying troops by the use of mustard gas in all probability would be much 
greater than with a corresponding amount of high explosive. In order to test this conclusion and 
develop modified defence procedures, equipment and prophylactics for tropical use, further trials 
were clearly needed with air weapons and spray attacks with mustard gas on troops on beaches, 
tropical island fringes and in jungle forest. But by the end of 1943, those in charge of chemical-
warfare tests had good reason to believe that mustard gas could be far more useful in the Pacific than 
it had been on the European battlegrounds of the First World War.41 
 In this same document it was stated that “the 125-ton per week of HT or 100-ton per week of 
TGH which Canada can produce is available to this country [i.e. the United States]. Additional 
material could probably be made available to this country from the United Kingdom.” The supplies 
of chemical warfare agents were now regarded as a communal Allied resource.42  
 In addition to responsibility for the preparation and loading of toxic gases into munitions, the 
Directorate of Chemical Warfare and Smoke (D. C. W. S.) was also responsible for research into 
smoke and flame weapons. Smoke weapons were studied extensively by a sub-committee of the US-
                                                 
41
 A discussion of the work of Gorrill in Australia regarding the enhanced blistering effect of vesicants under tropical 
conditions may be found in the minutes of the US-CCWAC January 5 1944. Found in NA (UK) WO 188/702. At the US-
CCWAC Subcommittee on Levinstein H Purification meeting of December 15 1943 it was recommended that for air 
burst munitions, where it is necessary to use thickened charging, a purified H, TGH, or HT be used, and in addition the 
interior of the munitions had to be coated to avoid corrosion during storage. The corrosion of light case bombs and land 
mines filled with mustard was found to present serious problems, as these munitions would not stand the pressure 
development resulting from the decomposition of the mustard filling. They could only be filled with stabilised mustard 
(usually stabilised with hexamine) or purified mustard, and then only if used within approximately two weeks of 
charging! This implied that if chemical munitions of these natures were to be used in the Pacific theatre, the chemical 
agents would either have to be prepared in-theatre (probably in Australia) or shipped there to filling depots in bulk 
containers. Pressure development was found to be greatly accelerated when containers and filled bombs sent from Britain 
were transferred from the holds of refrigerated ships to the tropical temperatures. There were instances of filled munitions 
bursting in Australia.  The Australians eventually obtained filled bombs with satisfactory performance under tropical 
conditions from the United States. 
 
42
 US-CCWAC Subcommittee on Levinstein H Purification, 15 December 1943: restricted by law in LAC.  Found in NA 
(UK) WO 188/702. 
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CCWAC and tested in field trials at Suffield. Smoke may be used for many purposes in military 
actions. Smoke may be used for defensive and offensive screening of troop formations; large area 
smoke screens43 may provide concealment for ship anchorages, potential ground targets, including 
airfields, main supply routes, bridge and river crossings, and in amphibious and beachhead 
operations. Coloured smokes may be used to mark targets for artillery and air attacks, or to 
coordinate such attacks; signalling the direction of advance to friendly troops and allowing 
recognition of armoured fighting vehicles (A. F. V.’s) from the air. Toxic smokes would be used to 
incapacitate or kill enemy troops if able to penetrate the respirators. The types of weapon considered 
the most suitable for laying down a smoke screen or throwing up coloured smoke signals included 
static and mobile generators, hand grenades, mortar bombs and 25 pr. shells. Up until the latter part 
of 1942 there had been no Army requirement in Canada for the production of coloured smoke 
weapons, and, therefore the manufacture of such equipment had not been initiated.44 It was felt that 
by using the British designs and filling methods there would be no major difficulty should the 
production of such weapons in Canada be required. British experience in the use of coloured smoke 
had been gained in the fighting in the Middle East. By 1943, however, the Canadian D. C. W. S. 
believed that German progress in the field of smoke weaponry was more advanced than that of the 
Allies. The Canadian Chiefs of Staff ordered a major series of field trials with smoke at Suffield, 
using smoke generators, mortars, smoke shells and grenades.45 As Suffield did not have a sufficient 
                                                 
43
 These are termed smoke curtain installations (SCI).  LAC, HQS 4354-24-7-1 Chemical Warfare - Offensive weapons - 
Smoke curtain installations (SCI). 
 
44
 Many difficulties in manufacture of coloured smoke munitions are revealed. For example: “recent tests on the 60mm. 
coloured shell, T8, have been encouraging, however most of the first shell filled under a pressure of less than 25 tons dead 
load have exploded in the mortar.” Also “the only manufacturing problem concerned with coloured smokes at the present 
time is that of obtaining raw materials of uniform particle size and density.” NARA RG175 Box 138 October 19 1943, 
Smoke Generation. 
 
45
  LAC Chemical Warfare - Canadian Chemical Warfare Inter-Service Board minutes, Microfilm reel C-5006 is 
“restricted by law.” The file used was retrieved from NARA RG 175, Box 138 Office of the Chief of Chemical Warfare, 
Chemical Warfare Intelligence Bulletin No. 24, German Combat Smoke Tactics. 
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quantity of smoke bombs, mortar shells and smoke generators available, the American C.W.S. 
supplied some munitions from Edgewood Arsenal for the trials.46 Recommendations were 
subsequently made regarding combinations of colours to be avoided in any signalling code.47 
  The First Canadian Army used extensive tactical smoke screening for the first time near 
Calais, at Cap Gris Nez on September 23 1944 during Operation Undergo.48 This smoke screen lasted 
for six days, pausing only for air bombardment, using up 147 tons of smoke generators. After this 
experience the Canadian Army used tactical smoke screening on an ever increasing scale.49 The 
Canadians did have flame warfare Technical Staff, but did not have smoke units as such, and as a rule 
obtained their supporting smoke detachments from the smoke companies of the British Pioneer Corps 
(Royal Pioneer Corps in 1946).50 A typical operation, such as Operation Switchback51 during the 
clearing of the Scheldt Estuary west of Antwerp which lasted from October 9 to November 3 1944, 
employed a total of 356 tons of smoke generators. Borrowing detachments and equipment from the 
British was not a satisfactory solution for the Canadians. One proposal for the formation of a Smoke 
                                                 
46
  LAC HQS 4354-32-1 Report of Smoke Weapons in Canada, February 2, 1943 is “restricted by law.” The equivalent 
data may be found in NARA RG175, Box 138 October 19 1943 Smoke Generation. 
 
47
 Orange and red; blue and violet were pairs of colours deemed difficult to resolve from the air at altitudes of 7,500 feet 
even with good visibility. These pairs were thus to be avoided. NARA RG175, Box 138 October 19 1943 Smoke 
Generation-Colored Manufacturing Problems Concerned with Smoke. This reference also contains details of coloured 
smoke compositions and a table of coloured smoke projectiles and generators and coloured flares. 
 
48
 Operation Undergo -The Capture of Calais & Cap Gris Nez in:  J. T. Copp, Cinderella Army: The Canadians in North-
West Europe 1944-1945, (Toronto 2006), pp.75-82. 
 
49
  LAC Microfilm Reel C-5010  Chemical Warfare - Offensive equipment - Smoke - Area screening 
 
50
 Major E. H. Rhodes-Wood, A War History of the Royal Pioneer Corps, 1939-1945, (Aldershot 1960). 
 
51
 J. T. Copp, Cinderella Army: The Canadians in North-West Europe 1944-1945, (Toronto 2006), pp. 88-117. 
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Company using the Besler smoke generator52 was made, but the end of the war prevented further 
development of this concept. 
 Flame weapons were becoming important for Canadian troops on the battlefields of Sicily and 
Italy, and would become even more important during the battles in Western Europe53 and in the 
Pacific campaigns.54   The British and Canadians fielded the Wasp (a Universal Carrier or Bren Gun 
Carrier mounting a flame-thrower) beginning in mid 1944. The inception of the Wasp began as early 
as 1940 when the British decided to develop a flame-thrower that could be mounted on a Universal 
Carrier. The gas-pressure-operated Canadian Ronson flame-thrower was selected. Canadian 
development dated back to August 1942, when an order for 1,300 Ronson flame throwers was placed 
in Canada and subsequently an increase in range was demanded, from approximately 50 yards to 100 
yards. Development was carried out simultaneously in Canada and the United Kingdom and two 
approaches were explored: the modification of the mechanical equipment and the development of 
special fuels. It was decided to focus on special fuels since work started in the United States indicated 
great promise. Good results were obtained with rubber mixture, but this work was dropped because of 
                                                 
52
 For a photograph of the Besler smoke generator (and an Esso generator) and an account of its employment in battle, see 
Col. M. E. Barker, “Smoke in Defense”, U. S. Coast Artillery Journal, January-February 1945, Volume LXXXVIII, 
Number 1, ( U. S. Chemical Warfare Service). 
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 See J. T. Copp, Cinderella Army: The Canadians in North-West Europe 1944-1945, (Toronto 2006), P.108 for an 
example of the activities of Chemical Warfare Officers in laying a smokescreen, and for use of the Wasp flame weapon. 
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 The flamethrower was tested in action against the French in February 1915 in the Verdun sector, but was more 
famously used against British troops at Hooge, near Ypres, on the night of 29-30 July the same year. After the First 
World War, the flamethrower was quickly discarded, since most armies considered it to have been a specialized device 
for the peculiar conditions obtaining in the trench warfare in Flanders. It reappeared in Italian hands in the Abyssinian 
campaign of 1935, when a tank-mounted flamethrower was employed, and also in small numbers in the Spanish Civil 
War. They can be vehicle mounted, as on a tank, or carried by infantry. The British Commonwealth and the United States 
were the most prolific users of vehicle mounted flame weapons; the British and Canadians fielded the Wasp at the 
infantry battalion level, beginning in mid 1944, and, eventually, incorporated them in infantry battalions. Early tank-
mounted flamethrower vehicles included the 'Badger' (a converted Ram tank) and the 'Oke', used first at Dieppe (the Oke 
was a Churchill tank fitted with a flame gun).  The most famous flame tank was the Churchill Crocodile. Flamethrowers 
were reportedly devastating to enemy morale, and were noted for their, “good moral effect, knocks out the [enemy's] will 
to fight,” and how it was “very effective and terrifying when properly used.” Battle Experience Questionnaires, Captain 
J.C. Watt, LAC RG 24, Vol. 10450, 173; A/Major Harold Mortimer Cunningham, LAC RG 24, Vol. 10450, 188. 
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the supply situation after the Japanese capture of Malaya. A thickener known as Napalm A55 was 
obtained from the United States and tried in Canada. In spite of some difficulty with stability, the 
range requirement was met. The United Kingdom meanwhile concentrated on Fuel Research 
Aluminium Stearate (FRAS)56 mixtures, peptized with xylenols. Enquiries made in Canada revealed 
that difficulty would be experienced in obtaining the materials for FRAS type fuels and in view of 
other advantages lying with napalm, it was concluded that this thickener was best suited for Canadian 
requirements, and a decision was made to standardise on this fuel. However the manufacturers 
experienced difficulty in producing stable napalm, which held up supplies to Canada. It subsequently 
proved possible to obtain sufficient materials for FRAS, given priority of supply for the materials, 
and quantities of this fuel were eventually prepared, with tests being carried out at Suffield to 
compare the Canadian product with the equivalent British mixtures. The Canadian work was 
accelerated after the November 1943 establishment of the US-CCWAC Subcommittee on 
Flamethrowers. 
 In addition to the technology of chemical munitions development, there was a human cost 
associated with Canadian chemical warfare preparations.  The British and Canadians had recruited 
                                                 
55Napalm is actually the thickener, which when mixed with gasoline or other petroleum-based fuel, makes a sticky 
incendiary gel. Gasoline or fuel oil was selected as the most readily available flammable fuels for flame weapons. 
Developed in the U.S. by a team of Harvard chemists led by Louis Fieser, its name is a combination of the names of its 
original ingredients, coprecipitated aluminium salts of naphthenic and palmitic acids. These were added to the flammable 
substance to cause it to gel. Because of gasoline's instability, volatility, and its rapid burning and self-consumption, its 
effectiveness as a flamethrower fuel was limited to within 30 yards. Napalm, through its unique properties, extended the 
effective range of flamethrowers to 150 yards. The agent developed in Britain for "gelling" gasoline (FRAS) proved 
difficult to use under front-line conditions in the tropics. The Australian army made a granular powder-essentially basic 
aluminium oleate-which the Australian army found highly successful. "Geletrol", as it was called, had the advantage of 
being easily mixed in the field. 
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 Fuel Research Aluminium Stearate or F. R. A. S. was a development of the British Petroleum Warfare Department. See 
NA (UK) AVIA 22/2303 for an account of these researches. For a detailed comparison of the differences and advantages 
of the two thickening agents, Napalm A and FRAS, see NA (UK) WO 188/702 Minutes of the US-CCWAC Meeting, 
January 5 1944 a. Criteria of the Ideal F/T Fuel and b. Comparison of Napalm Thickened Fuels and F. R. A. S. 
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soldiers to act as "observers"57 in chemical-warfare tests early in the Second World War. Most of the 
initial experiments were designed to test protective equipment such as respirators, clothing, and 
ointments, as Britain and Canada prepared for a German gas threat that never materialized. In most 
tests only a patch of exposed flesh was subjected to testing with mustard agent. However, in 1942 
after repeated requests from Porton staff in England, the Canadian staff at Suffield rewrote and 
relaxed the regulations58 and, as a result, volunteers in normal (non-impregnated) army uniform were 
sprayed with mustard gas from aircraft in a series of experiments at Suffield. These spray tests were 
to investigate the dropping of mustard from high altitude,59 a mode of delivery which required the 
thickening of the vesicant to avoid evaporation during the fall from great heights, and to test mustard-
filled bombs. Clearly such use of chemical weapons can only be regarded as an offensive war 
technique. After a trial in the summer of 1942, “eight people were hospital cases, six of whom were 
really bad.” The trial was deemed to have been a “success from the offensive point of view. The 
results from aircraft spray were not as good as was hoped for. Mr. Davies said that the only other 
hopeful way was the 50- lb. bomb.”60 More tests were deemed essential. Some 160 men were sprayed 
in another trial later that same summer.61 
                                                 
57
 In the somewhat quaint parlance of First World War Porton, human guinea pigs were termed observers, as they literally 
observed and recorded the effects of poison gases on themselves! This term which tends to “sanitize” the nature of the 
poison gas experiments on humans, was retained by Porton for many years. An observer was the same as a volunteer in 
Canada. 
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 A list of Amendments to The Regulations Governing Use of Subjects in Physiological Tests may be found in LAC 
HQS 4354-9-12.   
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 These tests were carried out after repeated requests from Porton in England. War experience in North Africa, with 
exposure to German anti-aircraft fire, had made it clear to the British that low altitude spraying of mustard was likely to 
be “non-habit forming.” NA (UK) AVIA 15/1071 Experimental Establishments: British Field Experimental Station in 
Canada: establishment and programme, 1941-42. 
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 Deadly Allies, p. 170. 
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 One description may suffice to give an impression of the nature of these tests, and the 
physical results:62 
532492  Private Chartland, H Dress: winter underwear (long limbed) 
Observer No. B8-F. E. No. 68 Part III  May 6/42 
  Issue shirts.  
  Battle dress (non impregnated). 
  Drill order; steel helmet, respirator at the gas position, sprayed with 
mustard spray from 1600 feet (low spray). Wind speed 10 m. p. h. 
Facing down wind,  
After contamination, transported by truck to a point 3 miles away where he lay 
about 21/2 hours. On second and third day, marched 35 miles. Fourth and fifth day, 
digging in. Sixth day – attacking a control company, marched 12 miles. Seventh 
day – defending. Eighth and ninth day – marched 30 miles. 
Examination: A large number of sharp erythema involving the left shoulder. A 
number of small vesicles developed within this area. The right shoulder was 
similarly involved. Both arms and buttocks showed scattered small areas of mild 
erythema. After 8 days, the shoulder lesions were seen to be healing normally with 
prominent amount of pigmentation and a number of healed lesions were apparent 
on the upper arms. 
Non-casualty (Class III). 63 
 
The same report contained details of similar tests on several other soldiers. Two of the other soldiers 
were Class I casualties with periods of disablement of 14 days. Further, mustard gas was well known 
to cause blindness, either temporary or permanent.64 A memorandum65 of June 23 1943 contained the 
following: 
 Attached correspondence from the Experimental Station, Suffield requests 
re-examination on 29 observers who developed eye lesions as the result of mustard 
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  LAC HQS 4354-31-1 DCWS. Lantern slides of these soldiers after the trials were forwarded to Research and 
Development Division at Edgewood Arsenal in Maryland in 1946. Presumably they are still there or at NARA. 
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  LAC Chemical Warfare - Correspondence - United States-Canada Chemical Warfare Advisory Committee is still 
“restricted by law.” These data were obtained from NARA RG 175 Box 138 United States-Canada Chemical Warfare 
Advisory Committee, Definition of vesicant casualties. The classification of casualties due to chemical burns may be 
summarized as follows: Class I: a casualty under any circumstances, regardless of how willing the man is to continue his 
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 Gassed by John Singer Sargent is the often-quoted example of the effects of mustard gas in blinding British soldiers in 
the First World War. 
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gas spray trials within the past few months. It is proposed that special examination 
be conducted by Capt. H. Macrae, R. C. A. M. C., ophthalmologist, now attached to 
Camp Borden Military Hospital. 
 
These ophthalmic casualties were the results from Field Experiment 68, “The Casualty Producing 
Power of Mustard Spray on Troops,” the subjects of which had been hospitalized from five to twenty-
one days.66  
The minutes of the US-CCWAC at Edgewood, May 15-16, 1944, Item B1 deals in part with a 
Suffield project which was “in progress”, using unthickened mustard to spray from 600, 400 and (“if 
necessary and advisable”) 200 feet on to men equipped with respirators, ointment and normal 
clothing. Suffield staff expressed the view that trials over observers in impermeable clothing with 
windows [cut in the clothing] were “completely unsatisfactory.” It was stated that in such a trial, they 
would be concerned “not with g/m2 placed on the ground nor with vapour concentrations as U. S. 
views suggest but with the number of men placed in hospital.”67 
Not surprisingly, the military found great difficulty in obtaining a steady supply of volunteers, as 
demonstrated by the following memorandum of May 24 1943 addressed to The Secretary of the 
Department of National Defence,68 signed by Brigadier F. M. W. Harvey of Military District 3. 
 Physiological Subjects: 
1.  It is requested that Para 2 C (ii) be amended so as to require all Physiological Subjects for 
the Experimental Station, Suffield to be obtained from Pacific Command. 
2.  Increasing difficulty has been experienced in securing Physiological Subjects from 
Military Districts 10, 12 and 13, as there are no sources of trained troops or of troops who 
have not yet completed training. 
 
 In Appendix “C” of the Regulations Governing Use of Subjects in Physiological Tests, 
(Information for the use of officers only in enlisting volunteers), it is stated that “all tests are carried 
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 Bryden, Deadly Allies, P. 170. 
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 Underlining added by author.   LAC Chemical Warfare - Correspondence - Reports - United States-United Kingdom-
Canada Chemical Warfare Advisory Committee is still “restricted by law.” Details of these discussions were retrieved 
from NA (UK) WO 188/702.  
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out under very careful medical supervision and under scientifically controlled conditions and 
consequently NO permanent injury is likely to occur.”69 The capitalization was present in the report. 
 The appalling effects of a massive dose of mustard gas on the human body were demonstrated 
by an accident which occurred on September 10 1943 involving a young man only identified as 
Lieutenant “A.” He arranged a demonstration of gas for his platoon as part of the day’s training 
programme. He obtained from the local Home Guard some lachrymatory smoke, some ordinary 
smoke and two mustard gas bombs, which had apparently been given to the Home Guard by a Royal 
Artillery Regiment about 6 months previously when they had left the area. At 1600 hours when 
demonstrating one of the gas bombs, he ignited it, but it did not explode. Some 15 minutes later he 
approached it and kicked it. It then exploded, and he was seen by witnesses to be drenched from head 
to foot with liquid. He immersed his face in water and applied anti-gas ointment to his face and 
hands, and then wiped his face and hands with a towel. He subsequently put on a complete change of 
clothing. He was admitted to hospital, feeling and looking perfectly well, at about 1700 hours on the 
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  LAC HQS 4354-9-12 dated June 5 1945. Chemical Warfare - Experimental Station, Suffield - Physiological subjects – 
General is still “restricted by law.” The reports used here were retrieved from NA (UK) WO 188/812, Minutes of 
Canadian Chemical Warfare Committee, Chemical Warfare Laboratories Advisory Committee and the Inter-service 
Working Committee on Chemical Warfare. The claim that “NO permanent injury is likely to occur” is open to serious 
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exposure to vesicant agents, was not applied in the conduct of the human experimentation. The Chemical Warfare 
Laboratories (CWL) maintained a central information service on chemical warfare and related subjects, some 30,000 
technical documents having been filed and indexed there. It would be interesting to examine the technical records of the 
CWL – if available - and determine which wartime reports within the archives contain material relating to chromosomal 
damage. 
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same day. After treatment with anti-gas ointment in the hospital (some 15 tubes were used), by 1830 
hours he began to have a frequent dry, racking cough and very frequent bouts of vomiting. Each bout 
was followed by cyanosis of the face and neck. At 2030 hours he was evacuated by ambulance to a 
Canadian General Hospital-6 1/2 hours after gassing. Some 4 pages of medical description of his 
unhappy demise, after the passage of 174 hours of systemic breakdown, follow. An autopsy revealed, 
among other fascinating details, that “the skin of the upper and lower extremities, trunk and abdomen 
could be wiped off by the gloved hand…. The picture so far [of the condition of his kidneys] is 
compatible with an acute chemical nephrosis.” The comment section of the report stated that “it is 
regretted that the blood studies were not more complete and more frequent; but it is to be noted, with 
interest, that the patient showed no diarrhoea, but rather a marked obstipation.”  
 The report further stated “in spite of four years of war and an immense amount of military 
training there still exists in many places a lamentable ignorance of: (a) the gases themselves and (b) 
what to do when an accident occurs.” In the conclusions section of this report, the statement was 
made “If this unfortunate officer had been wearing a respirator when the explosion occurred and had 
immediately stripped off his clothes to the bare skin, he would be alive today.” However, the manual 
Gas Training 1942 – page 62, Para IV explicitly states: 
Precautions when demonstrating mustard gas in pint pots or bottles, steel 1 litre. – 
when demonstrating the gas, undue precautions on the part of the demonstrator are 
to be avoided as likely to teach a false lesson; he will therefore, wear no protective 
equipment apart from eyeshields and application of gas ointment. All ranks 
present will wear eyeshields. 
 
The author of the formal report, Major A. R. Gordon, R. C. A. M. C., stated that “para 4 should be 
deleted and the following substituted: 
 Precautions when demonstrating explosive blister gas weapons: 
 when demonstrating the gas the demonstrator will adjust his facepiece [of 
his respirator] if it is necessary to approach the bomb for any reason after it has 
been ignited. If, through an accident, he becomes splashed with blister gas, he will 
immediately strip to the skin, wash his eyes as taught, for 10 minutes, and proceed 
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with Personal Decontamination. This last may be done for him by an assistant, if 
possible, while the eyes are being washed. All ranks present will wear eyeshields. 
 
This would appear to be an excellent case of perfect hindsight. 70  
 Eventually, the Allies began emphasizing field tests that would help them decide whether to 
initiate offensive gas warfare on the tropical islands of the Pacific Theatre. This decision arose after 
the American invasion of Betio in the Pacific campaign.71 The collaboration of the United States, 
Great Britain and Canada included sharing data from test sites in Australia, India, Suffield, San Jose 
Island72 and Bushnell, Florida on the testing and development of chemical weapons. Field data were 
to be analyzed by the tri-partite Advisory Committee on the Effectiveness of Gas Warfare Materiel in 
the Tropics.73  
 In the closing months of the war against Japan, the use of chemical warfare against the 
Japanese homeland was reconsidered. After the German surrender, Britain was no longer a reciprocal 
hostage to chemical warfare. Gen. William Porter, head of the U.S. Chemical Warfare Service, had 
reviewed the appalling casualty figures for Iwo Jima and Okinawa and the anticipated cost of the 
planned invasion of Japan. He concluded there was a better way to overcome the resistance of 
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  LAC, HQS 4354-29-17-2. For another detailed description of the effects of mustard on an unfortunate family in 
England see: “A Fatal Case of Mustard Gas Poisoning”, F. Bedo Hobbs, M.D., M.R.C.P., D.P.H. Medical Superintendent, 
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 Betio is an island at the extreme southwest of South Tarawa. The island is most well known as being the scene of the 
Battle of Tarawa, fought from November 20 to November 23, 1943. It was the first offensive in the central Pacific region. 
Although the United State’s forces were ten times larger than the defending garrison, the Japanese were able to inflict 
substantial damage upon the U.S. force, including 990 killed and 2296 wounded in the U. S. Marine Corps. These heavy 
casualties sparked off a storm of protest in the United States, where the high losses could not be understood for such a 
tiny and seemingly unimportant island in the middle of nowhere. The losses at Tarawa may be explained by the difficulty 
of coordinating combined amphibious operations, one of the most demanding of military operations. At the time, Tarawa 
was the most heavily defended atoll invaded by Allied forces in the Pacific. In subsequent island battles the casualties 
became much worse as mainland Japan was approached. J. H. Alexander, Utmost Savagery: The Three Days of Tarawa, 
(Naval Institute Press 1995). 
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 San Jose Island, the second largest island of the Las Perlas group in Panama Bay. The recovery and destruction of old 
chemical weapons from the Allied tests in San Jose is a current source of controversy between Panama, Canada, the U. K. 
and the U. S. A. 
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 Minutes of meetings of the Advisory Committee on the Effectiveness of Gas Warfare Materiel in the Tropics, March 4, 
1944; May 17, 1944; July 19, 1944; and December 7, 1944, found in NARA, RG 175, 290/3/28/142. 
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Japanese field fortifications. General Porter believed he could kill or incapacitate Japanese soldiers 
by filling their bunkers and tunnels with mustard gas, phosgene, and other chemical agents. He 
estimated that the entire Japanese garrison on Tarawa, an atoll that included Betio Island, could have 
been eliminated with as little as 900 tons of mustard gas, compared to the 3,000 tons of high 
explosives that had been used, with such little effect.74 To prove his theory, Porter wanted to conduct 
chemical warfare experiments in a tropical setting, and military planners quickly seized on San Jose 
as the perfect location for testing. The island was uninhabited and relatively isolated, yet close 
enough to mainland Panama, some 60 miles away, to be easily resupplied.75  
 Porter then turned to his colleagues in Canada for assistance. By this point in the war 
Canadian political leaders probably had to consider what contribution they were willing to make to 
the final defeat of Japan. With a general election in the immediate future, Canadian Prime Minister 
King was thinking of the manpower issue and its effects on the prospects for Liberal party re-
election. His observations in his diary are cogent: 
I said that Council would recall that when we were deciding on a question of war 
policy generally and particularly in reference to the Japanese war at the time of the 
Quebec Conference, it had been agreed in the Cabinet that there should be no 
conscription for the Army to go to Japan.   
….. Crerar spoke very strongly against any army going to Japan. He was taken up 
sharply by Mackenzie, who said that this would be ruinous on the Pacific coast. I 
pointed out that Mackenzie had misunderstood Crerar, that what he was arguing 
was not against our making a real contribution as between the different forces but 
the wisdom of an army force of a size which would necessitate conscription or 
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 On December 20, 1943, the US Consul proposed to conduct "certain chemical warfare tests under existing jungle 
conditions" for 60-day renewable periods on San José Island. The agreement had to be made with both the government of 
Panama and the island's private owners, a Panama City firm called Huertematte & Co. A rental fee of $15,000 a year was 
agreed. The United States also sought Panama's consent to build trails and wharves and to incorporate the agreement into 
the 1942 base agreement signed the year before. The project formally began on January 6, 1944; two days after Panama 
gave permission to the United States to conduct "chemical warfare tests" on the island. Within days hundreds of Army 
engineers arrived on the island to clear roads and an airstrip and build the many buildings for operations and housing the 
project would use. More than 400 enlisted men were stationed on the island by mid-1945, as well as nearly 200 officers 
and civilians from the United States, Panama and other countries. Many of the Army troops were Puerto Rican soldiers. 
L. P.  Brophy, and G. J. B. Fisher, The Chemical Warfare Service: Organizing for War, (Washington 1959), p. 136. 
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which would not be needed for the effort against Japan….. Are not all at this table 
agreed that there shall not be conscription for the Japanese war?76 
 In this case, I feel that the justice of the whole situation is entirely on our 
side. Our men have fought for 2 ½ years before the Americans were in the war at 
all. There is no reason on earth why we should be sending large additional 
numbers to the Pacific.77 
 
As always the problem would be with men for the infantry. Chemical warfare testing and supplies 
seemed to represent a safe Canadian contribution to the war in the Pacific. Canada had developed a 
fifty-pound mustard gas cluster bomb, which the U.S. military believed might offer the cheapest and 
best method of dispersing the chemical. The goals of the San Jose Project and a related test program 
at Bushnell, Florida,78 were laid out in a 1943 report by the Canadian Chemical Warfare Inter-service 
Board. The project would determine just how much gas was needed to produce casualties in tropical 
terrain ranging from swamp to thick jungle. Scientists also wanted to study how humidity and 
temperature affected the potency of mustard gas. Canadian and U.S. scientists were interested in two 
factors they believed made mustard gas ideal for use on the Japanese. The first was that soldiers 
fighting in the hot Pacific climate tended to wear lighter clothes and expose more skin than did those 
on European battlefields, giving them less protection against chemicals. In addition, there was a high 
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 King Diary, April 3 1945. As was the case throughout the war, the question of conscription was paramount and 
politically something which could not be dealt with. King stated that “it was desirable to keep out of (any) statement 
either the word conscription or the word volunteer. It had been suggested we might use the term elect to serve in the 
Japanese war.” At some point Macdonald stated that the contribution would have to be “indefinite.”  
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 King Diary, April 4 1945. King was also quite confident that the Canadian people would not countenance Canadian 
men helping Britain in the reconquest of her colonial empire in the Far East. He was probably correct. 
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 From November 1943 to October 1945 the Chemical Warfare Service Mobile Unit, a satellite unit of Dugway Proving 
Ground, Utah, conducted operations at Bushnell Army Air Field, Bushnell, Florida.  Although Bushnell A A Field 
provided storage and handling facilities to support the test operations, the testing was done in the Withlacoochee Forest 
13 miles SE of Bushnell. The first phase of work at the test area consisted of 23 tests of non-persistent gas, primarily 
phosgene.  The second phase, beginning January, 1944 consisted of 358 tests of seven types of mustard gas agents using 
bombs, rockets, mortars, cluster bombs, land mines, spray tanks and "Comings Candles."  Tests included both aerial and 
static tests. Canvas, rubber products and clothing were placed at test sites and farm animals in cages and large animals 
were staked at test sites. This is some of the densest swamp in Florida, with a few hummocks of high and dry ground. It is 
also directly above the Floridan Aquifer, the source of drinking water for millions of Floridians.  
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probability of secondary infections in the tropics. It might take months for the blisters caused by 
mustard gas to heal.  
It is well known that the slightest scratch or skin injury rapidly becomes infected 
unless great care is taken. It is probable that any injury produced by mustard gas 
would be similarly infected, thus delaying healing, and increasing 
hospitalization.79  
 
With Canada and Britain agreeing to participate in the project, one of Porter's senior officers, Brig. 
Gen. Alden Waitt, went to Ottawa in January 1944 to outline the American plan.80 Waitt was 
particularly interested in the Canadian cluster bomb which was to be tested on San Jose. He believed 
the weapon offered great potential for saturating the jungle with chemicals. "We are very interested in 
contaminating large areas of ground for a very long time," he told his Canadian counterparts.81  
 The U.S.-led test program, employing 400 soldiers and scientists working at a newly 
constructed base on the island, began in May 1944. The Canadians were aware that the Americans 
had difficulty in carrying out casualty tests on their own soldiers and offered one hundred Canadian 
soldiers as “volunteers.”82 The experiments covered a wide range of scenarios. Soldiers wearing 
backpacks with spray cylinders83  projected cyanogen chloride (CK) or hydrogen cyanide (AC) gas 
into bunkers built to simulate Japanese fortifications, where unprotected goats were tethered to 
wooden stakes and exposed to the gases. The goats all died. Another experiment used goats to test the 
relative merits of Japanese and American gas masks. Exposed to CK or AC, an unprotected animal 
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 Minutes of the 27th Meeting of the Canadian Chemical Warfare Inter-service Board, December 10 1943. 
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 By early 1944 the end of the European war was in sight. The invasion of Normandy was scheduled for June 1944. 
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 Remarks to the Canadian Chemical Warfare Inter-service Board, Brig. Gen. Alden Waitt, January 13 1944.  
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 Jet, Anti-Tank, Mark 1. See NA (UK) AVIA 15/896 for a photograph of this weapon for use against the Japanese. 
Cyanogen chloride is a highly toxic blood agent, as is hydrogen cyanide. Hydrogen cyanide (under the brand name 
Zyklon B) was perhaps most infamously employed by the Nazi regime in the Second World War. This is also the poison 
that Adolf Hitler used to commit suicide on April 30 1945. 
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and the animal wearing a Japanese mask quickly died. Unfortunately one goat wearing a Japanese 
small canister mask survived while another wearing an American M1XA2 mask died!84 Throughout 
the experiments, scientists sampled the atmosphere inside the bunkers and concluded that total 
dosages of CK sufficient to “break through” all types of Japanese canisters and deliver lethal dosages 
of CK for man were obtained in all the trials. 
 American and Canadian aircraft dropped mustard gas bombs on specific ground targets, after 
which troops clad in protective clothing were ordered to march through the contaminated area. The 
U. S. soldiers were exposed only if fully protected, except for patches cut out of the protective suits to 
expose their skin to the gas.  In August 1944, the experiments took a strange turn. The scientists 
wanted to determine if different races would react differently to mustard gas. Military officials 
believed the skin of non-whites might be tougher than that of Caucasians and better able to resist the 
effects of mustard.85 If that were proven, then non-white troops would be used during gas attacks. 
Because African-Americans were not allowed in front-line combat units at the time, it was decided to 
conduct tests on Hispanics. Between August 9 and August 15 1944, several tests were done to 
"determine if any difference existed in the sensitivity of Puerto Rican and continental U.S. troops to 
H [mustard] gas," according to a San Jose report. 86 A preliminary experiment involved exposing ten 
soldiers from each group. That was followed by a test involving forty-five Puerto Ricans and forty-
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four Caucasians. Mustard was put on the forearms of the soldiers, who were then observed for three 
days. The tests showed no difference. Both groups suffered equally and their skin was burned.  
              Early in 1945 the San Jose experiments gained new importance as more senior officers in the 
U.S. military began considering the use of chemical weapons against the Japanese, especially after the 
death of President Roosevelt on April 12 1945. Although none of the Allied nations wanted to be the 
first to use chemicals, U.S. casualty figures from the invasions of Pacific islands were extremely high 
and Japanese resistance had stiffened as the Allies drew closer to the home islands.87 “You can cook 
them better with Gas” the Chicago Tribune announced on March 11 1945.88 An Army project, 
SPHINX, tested gas against fortified cave defenses, leading General Porter to conclude that gas was 
the “most effective weapon for the penetration and reduction of caves and underground 
fortifications.”89 Even more appalling was the prospect revealed in a recently declassified plan to 
mount a massive poison-gas attack on Japan which would start with the drenching of much of Tokyo 
with gas. The other twenty-four target cities were to includeYokohama, Osaka, Kobe, Nagoya, and 
Kyoto.  
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 Comparative casualty data from Pacific islands invaded are: Biak Island 2,500; Peleliu 10,000; Iwo Jima 26,000; 
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 The plan was to launch the gas attack on Tokyo at eight o’clock in the 
morning when the greatest number of people would be concentrated in the city. 
…….Mustard gas …. Would be used against Yawata, Wakamatsu, and Kokura, a 
highly industrialized area….Liquid mustard gas was particularly selected for those 
cities because it is readily absorbed by wood which is almost impracticable to 
decontaminate. And since most Japanese cities are congested predominately with 
structures which are low and wooden….90 
 
This report proposed the killing of enemy civilians on a scale unprecedented in the Second World 
War. Thus Canadian support of chemical warfare in the Pacific, as a means of reducing Canadian 
commitments in that theatre, might have led to an unforeseen involvement with a mass killing of 
civilians beyond anything previously seen in the Second World War. But all of these considerations 
were rendered moot in August 1945, when the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
bringing the Second World War to a close. Racism was clearly a factor in the decision making for the 
Pacific war. This was demonstrated by the words of Mackenzie King:  
It is fortunate that the use of the bomb should have been upon the Japanese rather 
than the white races of Europe.91 
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     Chapter 4  
                     Conclusions 
To us of this day, the result of this part of the war seems a foregone conclusion.  
It was far from being so; and very far from being so regarded by our forefathers.1 
 
 During the course of the Second World War Canadian defence research scientists collaborated 
with the United Kingdom on many war technologies including radar, gun laying, explosives, 
proximity fuses, nuclear research, biological and chemical warfare, ballistics and aviation medicine. 
From 1939 to 1942 Canada, allied to the United Kingdom, prepared to defend itself against chemical 
attack by Nazi Germany. The Canadian chemical war preparations represented one of Canada’s many 
contributions to the cause of the Commonwealth and may have been used in an analogous manner to 
the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, to deflect pressure from Britain for large numbers of 
ground troops, a request which was politically impossible for Canada to fill. The conclusions 
regarding Canadian defence science and Allied military technology are summarized by Stacey. He 
states that it was a contribution – a share, and necessarily in most cases not a major share, in a great 
and complicated joint effort. He further points out that many Canadian projects were closely related 
to British ones and were essentially adaptations or developments of ideas or devices on which much 
British work had already been done. 2 
 After the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor, Canada became part of a coalition with the United 
States and the United Kingdom.3 This alliance not only prepared for defensive chemical war, but was 
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 F. Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, vol. 1 (Boston 1914), p. 3. 
 
2
 C. P.  Stacey, Arms, Men and Government, the War Policy of Canada, 1939-1945, (Ottawa 1970) p. 512. 
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 Through the United Kingdom and the overseas Empire, Australia, New Zealand and India were also involved in 
chemical warfare research. The reach of Porton was world wide.  
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prepared to use chemical weapons to attack the Japanese if they landed on the North American west 
coast. Canadian offensive chemical warfare preparations included preparation and testing of toxic 
gases and smokes, smoke screening and flame weapons. The chemical weapons produced in Canada 
were essentially the same as those constructed by the British and the Americans. Smoke screening 
and flame weapons were widely employed by Canadian troops in all active theatres of operations 
during the course of the Second World War. Poison gases were never used by Canada during this 
war. Canadian preparations for offensive gas warfare were principally directed against the Japanese.  
 One of the most important Canadian contributions to the alliance was the establishment of the 
Suffield Field Experimental Station in Alberta. This base was particularly useful in carrying out 
chemical weapon trials, in which approximately 2000 Canadian soldiers were exposed to mustard 
gas.4 Many were sprayed with this gas from aircraft. At the beginning of the war Canadian chemical 
warfare volunteers (observers to the British) were completely covered in protective clothing except 
for a patch to allow for controlled mustard burns. But by 1942 Suffield staff had rewritten the 
regulations for the trials, and volunteers often received significant chemical injuries, including to the 
eyes and genital region. Records of these weapons trials on Canadian soldiers are difficult to obtain in 
Canada, most being restricted by law. Many records, however, are available through the National 
Archives of the United Kingdom (NA (UK)), and the National Archives and Records Administration 
of the United States (NARA). The continued release of previously unavailable records, especially in 
the United Kingdom,5 suggests that a continuation of the study of Canadian chemical warfare 
activities during the Second World War may prove fruitful. For example, animals were used 
extensively in chemical warfare trials at Suffield, yet no records are to be found at Library and 
                                                 
4
 Library and Archives Canada [hereafter LAC], file 4354-26-10-1 
5
 Records of the Chemical Defense Research Establishment (CDRE) at Porton in the United Kingdom have recently 
become available at NA (UK), as a result of legal action in the U. K.  
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Archives Canada (LAC)) relating to such trials. Inquiries to senior veterinary scientists6 throughout 
Canada, and a comprehensive examination of all veterinary journals in North America from 1940 to 
1968 produced no records of the use, and subsequent euthanization, of animals during chemical 
warfare trials in Canada. However the records of the NA (UK) list files dealing with chemical 
warfare and animals, including photographs.7 Interviews with veterans of the chemical warfare trials 
were not attempted, due to a pending class action lawsuit against the Canadian government.8 
 The military usefulness of poison gases such as mustard is, surely, due to the reality that they 
damage or kill human beings. The most effective way to find out how these chemicals damage people 
is to expose men to them under warlike conditions in experiments. The scientific argument may be 
that the data obtained in these trials could not have been obtained in any other manner, which may be 
true. It is also true that the experiments carried out at Suffield - and elsewhere - by the Canadians and 
their allies did extend the understanding of the military value of several poison gases and developed 
techniques to deliver them on a battlefield. The full price however was paid by the Canadian 
volunteers, who in many cases were subjected to severe pain and damage, and in some cases may 
have suffered chronic illnesses later in life as a result of chemical testing. Surely, by the beginning of 
the war, the British scientists at Porton must have known that mustard gas could cause chronic lung 
diseases such as bronchitis, especially as the British government was paying pensions for gassed 
soldiers from the First World War.  
                                                 
6
 For example, Dr. J. M. Stookey, University of Saskatchewan; Dr. E. Olfert, University of Saskatchewan; Dr. D. 
MacDonald, historian of Alberta Veterinary Medical Association and  Dr. I. Barker,  Guelph University. The Manager, 
Communications and Member Services of the Alberta Veterinary Medical Association informed the author that of the 
veterinarians who have published historical information, three are deceased. Further, prior to the establishment of the 
Western College of Veterinarian Medicine at the University of Saskatchewan, all veterinary graduates achieved their 
DVM degrees from Guelph, except a few who came from the United States. The Royal Canadian Army Veterinary Corp 
was disbanded in 1940, before significant chemical warfare experimentation took place. 
 
7
 WO 188/1256 Organisation of veterinary gas service: chemical warfare and animals. 
 
8
 http://www.merchantlaw.com/backgnd.pdf 
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 Canadian scientists were aware of the possibility of mustard exerting a mutagenic effect on 
cells early in the war. This is another area of Canadian chemical warfare testing which should be 
pursued, as the Canadian Chemical Warfare Laboratories were the repository of much of the Allied 
chemical warfare scientific research during the Second World War, and may contain scientific data 
published after the war in the open literature. Such data would confirm that the directors of the 
Canadian Chemical Warfare Service should have been aware of the possibility of long-term harm to 
Canadian soldiers used in the tests. 
 The appalling and unforgivable experiments perpetrated by Nazi doctors and scientists – and 
the conveniently forgotten equivalents carried out by Japanese scientists in China9 – in the 
extermination camps during the Second World War led to the Nuremberg Code10, the first major 
attempt to establish a universal set of ethics to control human experimentation. The details of the 
Nazi experiments were revealed during the war crimes trials and, fortunately for them, the Allies 
were not required to reveal their own chemical warfare experiments to a horrified world in a similar 
manner. Perhaps the reluctance of governments to release the details surrounding their chemical 
warfare tests gives an indication of how controversial and disturbing such experiments are perceived 
to be today? However the ethics of the chemical warfare experiments must surely be judged by the 
standards and circumstances of the time. A destructive and total war was being waged, and the Allies 
faced a very dangerous threat from the Nazis and the Imperial Japanese. Few even today would argue 
that war and peace are the same - wartime is different. What needed to be done to protect the nation, 
had to be done. Many probably regarded ethics as a nicety at the time. After all, is war not a 
                                                 
9
 For an introduction to this subject see: S. H. Harris, “The American Cover-up of Japanese Human Biological Warfare 
Experiments, 1945-1948”, in R. M. MacLeod, ed., Science and the Pacific War, (New York 2000) pp. 253-269. Japan 
paid nearly $3 million to China after poisonous gas from old Japanese chemical weapons killed one man and injured 
dozens in August 2003. The poisonous gas was left in barrels in China by the Japanese Imperial Army after World War II. 
Japan is working to remove from China all remaining 700,000 chemical weapons (Tokyo October 20 2003). 
 
10
 “Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10”, v.  2, pp. 181-
182. (Washington 1949). 
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murderous and immoral activity? Most Canadians would surely believe that whatever the rights or 
wrongs of the decisions to carry out chemical warfare experiments with fellow Canadians who 
volunteered, any one of the subjects who subsequently received injuries of a long-term nature from 
the tests should be adequately compensated for their injuries. The impression one receives concerning 
such compensation in Canada is that it has been a long and uphill fight.11 
 The Second World War turned out to be the unfought chemical war for Canada and its allies. 
Apart from a disastrous release of mustard gas at Bari in Italy in December 1943 as a result of a 
German air raid, there was virtually no battlefield release of poison gas during the Second World 
War.12 The largest use of poison gas must have been the Nazi use of Zyklon B (HCN) to murder large 
numbers of human beings in extermination camps. On two occasions during the latter part of the war 
serious consideration was given by Allied war leaders for the use of poison gas against the enemy. 
After the Normandy landings in 1944 the Nazi military bombarded south-east England, London and 
Antwerp with the first of the “vengeance weapons” the V-1.13 In July 1944, Prime Minister Churchill, 
anxious to retaliate against the German V-1 (and later V-2) attacks, directed his military advisers to 
                                                 
11
 See http://www.vac-acc.gc.ca/general/sub.cfm?source=department/press/chem_dnd_back for the Canadian government 
approach to the situation. Similar programmes exist in Australia and the U. K. The Canadian government is currently 
being sued by veterans exposed to chemical agents:  See 
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/saskatchewan/story/2006/11/09/chemical.html for the case of a Saskatchewan veteran.  
 
12
 On December 2 1943, the port of Bari was crowded with 30 Allied ships. An air raid was carried out by Nazi German 
bombers. In the attack, 20 German Junkers Ju 88 bombers achieving complete surprise, bombed Allied shipping and 
personnel operating in support of the Allied Italian campaign, sinking 17 cargo and transport ships in Bari harbour. Of the 
ships destroyed, the John Harvey was carrying a cargo of about 100 thousand kilograms of mustard-gas bombs. Much of 
the mustard gas was released into the water and some of it dissolved in the floating oil. There were over 1,000 military 
and merchant marine casualties, some 800 were admitted to local hospitals. 628 suffered from the mustard gas, of whom, 
69 died within two weeks. Medical treatment was handicapped by a lack of awareness of the presence of the mustard gas 
bombs. After the attack, Allied leaders, including Eisenhower, Roosevelt, and Churchill ordered that the full story of the 
disaster be kept secret. The U.S. records of the attack were declassified in 1959 but the episode remained obscure until 
1967. In 1986 the British government admitted to Bari raid survivors that they had been exposed to mustard gas and 
amended their pension payments accordingly. R. Atkinson, The Day of Battle: The War in Sicily and Italy, 1943-1944. 
(Henry Holt 2007). 
 
13
 Between June 1944 and March 29 1945, the V-1 was fired at targets in south-eastern England and Belgium, specifically 
London and Antwerp. On June13 1944, the first V-1 struck London next to the railway bridge on Grove Road, Mile End. 
Eight civilians were killed in the blast. The V-1 was the first cruise missile. 
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evaluate dispassionately “the question of poison gas.”14 Churchill warned that “We could drench the 
cities of the Ruhr and many other cities in Germany in such a way that most of the population would 
require medical attention.”15 The Chiefs of Staff advised against initiating chemical war. Churchill 
grudgingly gave way, commenting: “clearly I cannot make head against the parsons and the warriors 
at the same time.”16 As the Nazi military had discovered two nerve agents before the war, and 
stockpiled munitions filled with tabun, of which the Allies were unaware, the decision was perhaps 
fortuitous!17 
 In the final months of the war against Japan, the case for using chemical weapons was 
reopened by the American CWS and General William N. Porter.18 Because of its predictable wind 
patterns and several other factors, Japan was particularly vulnerable to gas attack. Such attacks would 
neutralize the Japanese tendency to fight from caves - caves would only increase the soldiers' 
exposure to gas. Although chemical warfare had been outlawed by the Geneva Protocol, neither the 
United States nor Japan was a signatory at the time. While the United States under President 
Roosevelt had promised never to initiate gas warfare, Japan had used gas against the Chinese earlier 
in the war. By the summer of 1945, however, President Roosevelt was dead and the war in Europe 
was over. A new and inexperienced president had to make a decision with respect to an invasion of 
                                                 
14
 Winston S. Churchill to the COS, July 6 1944, National Archives of the United Kingdom [hereafter NA (UK)], 
Premiers Office [hereafter PREM] 3/89. 
15
 Ibid., 
 
16
 Ibid., Churchill to General Ismay, July 29 1944. 
 
17
 Tabun and sarin were two nerve agents available to the Nazis. Only tabun was produced in quantity by the end of the 
war. These chemicals are liquid at room temperature and are a class of phosphorus-containing organic chemicals 
(organophosphates) that disrupt the mechanism by which nerves transfer messages to organs. The disruption is caused by 
blocking acetylcholinesterase, an enzyme that normally relaxes the activity of acetylcholine, a neurotransmitter. Allied 
respirators would have offered little if any protection against these agents. 
 
18
 National Archives and Records Administration of the United States [hereafter NARA], Memorandum, Major General 
William N. Porter to Director, New Development Division, Subject: The Use of Gas against Caves, July 13 1945, 
Operations Planning Division 385, Chemical Warfare Planning, Box 120. See also “Project SPHINX: The Question of  
the Use of Gas in the Planned Invasion of Japan”, John Ellis van Courtland Moon, The Journal of Strategic Studies, v. 12, 
n. 3, 1989, pp. 303–323. 
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Japan. The use of chemical weapons during such an invasion was one of several equally repellent 
options, including eventually, the use of the atomic bomb.19  Canadian chemical weapons represented 
an apparently safe Canadian contribution to the war in the Pacific. Canada had developed a fifty-
pound mustard gas cluster bomb, which the U.S. military believed would offer the cheapest and best 
method of dispersing the chemical. It is unlikely that the use of chemical weapons would have 
remained restricted to tactical purposes in the event of an invasion of Japan. If cities had been 
fortified and turned into battlefields, it is likely that they too would have been gassed, with appalling 
casualties.20 Canada would then have been associated with the mass killing of civilians, in the eyes of 
a critical posterity. Such a chemical Armageddon, thankfully, never took place.  
 In October 1945 George Merck, a consultant of the American Secretary of War, had prepared 
a summary of the research involved in the American combined biological/chemical warfare 
programme operated by the U. S. Chemical Warfare Service.21 It contained only a passing reference 
to the Canadian (and British) contributions to chemical (and bacteriological) warfare preparations, a 
fact which angered the Canadian chairman of the Directorate of Chemical Warfare and Smoke, Otto 
Maass.  He felt that the Americans were taking all the credit and ignoring the Canadian contribution. 
In spite of all protests by Maass, the Americans informed him that the Canadians (and the British) 
could say whatever they wanted, but the Americans were using the Merck report.22 Maass was clearly 
a scientist and never a politician! The final decision regarding public release of information regarding 
                                                 
19
 One of the great historiographical arguments of modern America concerns generally the defeat of Japan and 
specifically the use of the atomic bombs. The first (plutonium) atomic bomb in history was detonated at the Alamogordo 
Test Range on July 16 1945. It was not certain that this weapon would work until this test had been carried out. The first 
uranium bomb was ready for use against Japan in August 1945. The military planners of the invasion of Japan took no 
note of the bomb in their plans. J. R. Skates, The Invasion of Japan Alternatives to the Bomb, (South Carolina 1994). 
 
20
 T. B. Allen and N. Polmar, “ Gassing Japan”, The Quarterly Journal of Military History, v. 10, n. 1, 1997, pp. 38-43. 
 
21
 NARA  Merck report, RG165, Entry 488, Box 182. 
 
22
  J. Bryden, Deadly Allies: Canada’s Secret War 1937-1947, p. 233-234, (Toronto 1989). 
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Canadian chemical warfare (and biological warfare) lay with Mackenzie King and the Cabinet War 
Committee. Given the distaste of King and his political associates for chemical warfare, it was not 
surprising that little information was released to the public. In all probability King and his advisors 
were content to allow the entire Canadian chemical (and bacteriological) warfare programme to 
disappear into the mists of time. Most Canadian chemical weapons were dumped in the oceans on 
both the east and west coasts of Canada, where they are currently a source of considerable 
environmental concern.23 This was common practice after both of the wars.24 
 By 1947 the Defence Research Station at Suffield had become the responsibility of the 
Canadian Defence Research Board.25 The Allied chemical warfare communities which were at that 
time concerned with investigating the German nerve agents recognized the need for continued 
cooperation, especially as the “cold war” developed.26 A formalized tripartite co-ordination of 
research in chemical warfare began in 1947. Human testing of chemical weapons such as the nerve 
agents sarin and VX gas continued well into the 1960s, and dangerous defoliation agents were tested 
at Canadian Forces Base Gagetown from 1956 to 1967. These tests left Canada with large stockpiles 
                                                 
23
 See the Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries and Oceans Issue 13 – Evidence, Ottawa, 
September 30 2003 for a discussion of the dumping of munitions. In February 1946, a barge containing 2,800 tons of 
mustard gas and 10,219, 45-gallon drums was scuttled off of Sable Island. Access to Information requests identified the 
location as 42 degrees, 50 minutes north by 60 degrees, 12 minutes west — only 30 kilometres from a present-day oil 
exploration site. Secrecy about the existence and disposal of chemical weapons is still strong in Canada. In 1984, 
following reports of injuries and death of members of a Danish fishing crew who had been exposed to mustard gas from 
leaking grenades that were hauled up in their nets off the coast of Denmark, Canada's Department of Transport Deputy 
Minister Withers asked National Defence to investigate if this could ever be a problem for our country's fishermen. One 
reply from DND stated, "No such items were known to have been disposed of by Canada." 
 
24
 From the time of the First World War until 1972 it was thought that the vastness of ocean waters would absorb 
chemical agents that might leak from chemical munitions and render the chemical compounds harmless through dilution 
and chemical reactions. However, public concerns about human health and environmental risks, and the economic effects 
of potential damage to marine resources, in addition to increasing access to even deep ocean waters for resource 
exploitation led to a statutory prohibition on the disposal of chemical weapons in the ocean in 1972. This of course does 
not address the problem of munitions which have already been disposed to the oceans. The lack of coordinates for most of 
the disposal sites, and the possibility that ocean currents may have moved weapons beyond these areas, makes finding the 
weapons difficult at best, if not impracticable in many cases. 
 
25
 Dinosaurs to Defence: A Story of the Suffield Block, BATUS and others (London 1986) 
 
26
 The Cold War was the period of conflict, tension and competition between the United States and the Soviet Union and 
their respective allies from the mid-1940s until the early 1990s. 
  94  
 
of chemical weapons. Canada eventually abandoned the use of lethal chemical weapons, and 
developed methods to safely destroy them. It presently assists other nations with constructing 
facilities to safely destroy their chemical arsenals.27 Canada ratified the Chemical Weapons 
Convention on September 26 1995. However, its government still employs riot control agents which 
are classified as chemical weapons. 
 
                                                 
27
 http://www.opcw.org/pressreleases/2006/PR48_2006.html 
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APPENDIX A  Industrial manufacture of mustard gas 
 If mustard gas is to be used as a war gas, the preparation must obviously be on a very large 
scale. Mustard gas may be prepared industrially by several processes, all of which are based on one 
of two basic methods: Meyer's and Guthrie's. The various stages of manufacture by Meyer's process, 
which is often referred to as “the German process," as it was largely employed during the First World 
War by Germany, may be schematically expressed as follows: 
 
Clearly if ethylene gas were available as a by-product of the petroleum industry, as it was in Canada 
during the Second World War, the process would be greatly simplified as step (a) would be 
eliminated and ethanol, which had significant strategic value would not have to be used. 
 
 Guthrie's method, which was used by the Allies during the First World War, and is, therefore, 
referred to as “the Allied process," consists simply in acting on sulphur chloride with ethylene: 
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Meyer's Method: 
Preparation of Ethylene Chlorohydrin  
  This reaction is carried out in large cylindrical iron pans, lined with lead and coated 
externally with cork. 5 cu. m. (1,100 gallons) of water and bleaching powder equivalent to 500 kg of 
active chlorine is placed in this vessel and while stirring well a current of carbon dioxide is 
introduced in order to liberate part of the hypochlorous acid. After about 20 minutes, ethylene instead 
of carbon dioxide is introduced to saturation point and finally carbon dioxide and ethylene 
simultaneously until all the hypochlorite has reacted. The reaction should be carried out at as low a 
temperature as possible, between 5° and 10° C , the reaction mixture being cooled by circulating a 
cooling mixture through coils. After the ethylene has been absorbed, the reaction products are 
pumped through a filter-press to remove the calcium carbonate and the filtrate, which contains from 
10 to 12% ethylene chlorohydrin, is distilled in steam so as to obtain a solution containing 18-20% of 
the chlorohydrin. 
Preparation of Thiodiglycol  
 The theoretical quantity of sodium sulphide is added to the chlorohydrin solution, prepared as 
already described, and the mixture heated to about 90° to 100° C, the product being drawn over into 
an evaporator and again heated to remove all the water. The thiodiglycol formed is filtered, and 
distilled in vacuum. 
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NOTE. According to Nenitzescu, the preparation of thiodiglycol may be carried out by reacting 
ethylene oxide with hydrogen sulphide at 40° to 60oC in presence of a small quantity of thiodiglycol 
which acts as a solvent for the two gases. 
 
This method gives a yield of 90%. 
Preparation of Dichloroethyl Sulphide  
 The chlorination of thiodiglycol is carried out in cylindrical cast-iron pans, 2.5 m. in height 
and 2.8 m. in diameter, lead-lined and jacketed so that the reaction mass may be heated and cooled. 
The hydrochloric acid necessary for the chlorination is first passed through sulphuric acid and then 
introduced into the thiodiglycol as slowly as possible so as to obtain complete absorption. During the 
reaction the temperature is held at about 50o C. Two layers form in the pan, a heavy oily one 
consisting of a solution of dichloroethyl sulphide in thiodiglycol and an upper one consisting of an 
aqueous solution of hydrochloric acid. At the end of the reaction, the oily layer is drawn over into a 
lead-lined iron vessel fitted with lead coils for heating and a condenser, also constructed of lead, 
connected to a vacuum pump. The water is removed by distillation under reduced pressure (60-70 
mm.) and the residual liquid then treated in a mixer with suitable solvents. 
Guthrie's Method (the Allied Process). 
  This method, comparatively simple for preparing small quantities of dichloroethyl sulphide in 
the laboratory, presented considerable technical difficulties when first used on the industrial scale. 
These were later overcome by the efforts of British and American chemists. Compared with the 
Meyer process, the Guthrie method allows the product to be prepared more rapidly and in better 
yield, but it requires careful control during the course of the reaction. Several systems of manufacture 
were proposed and actually employed during the First World War for the preparation of dichloroethyl 
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sulphide by this process. The most successful procedure in practice was that of Levinstein1 which 
was used by the Allies. Hence the term ‘Levinstein Mustard’. 
 The preparation of dichloroethyl sulphide by this method was carried out in a cylindrical 
vessel of sheet steel or cast-iron, lead-lined and jacketed, of about 100 cm. diameter and 130 cm. in 
height, fitted with an agitator. This vessel has a lid through which a pipe passes to within a short 
distance of the bottom in order to introduce the ethylene 
 Sufficient sulphur monochloride to cover the end of the tube is first placed in the vessel and 
then ethylene is bubbled in, so arranging the speed of its introduction and the cooling that the 
temperature of the reaction mixture remains at 30° to 35° C. Meanwhile more sulphur monochloride 
is added in small portions. Employing 430 kg of ethylene, which needs 750 kg of sulphur chloride, 
the reaction is completed in about 20 hours.  
Appendix B  The Chemistry of Mustard Damage and the Nature of Ointments. 
Mustard gas is the organic compound described with the condensed formula (ClCH2CH2)2S. It has 
several other names both chemical and trivial. Mustard gas may be synthesized by a number of 
methods including treating sulfur dichloride with ethylene (the Levinstein process, as described in 
Appendix A). This method results in a product contaminated by polysulphides. 
  SCl2 + 2 C2H4  (ClCH2CH2)2S  Equation 1. 
Although the compound is commonly known as "mustard gas", it is a viscous liquid at ambient 
temperatures. The pure compound has a melting point of 14°C (57°F) and decomposes before boiling 
at about 218 °C (423 °F). If it is to be distilled the process requires reduced pressure (vacuum 
distillation). Mustard readily eliminates chloride ion by intramolecular nucleophilic substitution to 
                                                 
1
 Dr. Herbert Levinstein, president of the British Institute of Chemical Engineers. Levinstein was considered the Empire's 
leading expert on war gases. Although entering late into the field of chemical warfare production, Doctor Herbert 
Levinstein, Professor A. G. Green, and their collaborators of the firm of Levinstein Limited were able to rapidly develop a 
successful industrial mustard gas process which was of considerable assistance to Britain and America during the First 
World War. 
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form a cyclic sulfonium ion. This very reactive intermediate tends to bond to the guanine nucleotide 
in DNA strands, which is detrimental to cellular health. This alkylation leads to either cellular death 
or perhaps cancer. Mustard gas is sparingly soluble in water but is very soluble in fat and oils, 
contributing to its rapid absorption into human skin. 
  The British and Canadian ointments were an attempt to destroy the mustard by chemical 
reaction with the strong base and oxidizing agent bleaching powder (or chloramine-T) dispersed in 
Vaseline™, when the mustard was on the skin. They were ineffective as some of the mustard had 
usually penetrated and reacted with human skin before any ointment could be applied. The American 
ointment Impregnite S-330 containing guanidine carbonate (or nitrate) was probably an attempt to 
make reactive NH2 groups of the guanidine moieties available for the mustard to react with, instead 
of reacting with the base groups on DNA molecules. Perhaps the guanidine could be regarded as a 
cutaneous chemical scavenger for mustard? Figure 2 shows a schematic model of guanidine 
carbonate (CAS 593-85-1). Six base groups would be available for reacting, while the carbonate 
would be able to react with the HCl produced by the mustard. Guanidine is formed in urine as a 
normal product of protein metabolism in the body, by the oxidation of guanine. 
 
 Figure 2 Guanidine carbonate (Taken from ChemBlink) 
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Figure 3 Mechanism of formation of mustard gas-guanine adduct and hydrochloric acid. Guanidine 
as a potential reactant for the mustard is also shown. 
 
 In the wider sense, compounds with the structural element BCH2CH2X, where B is any 
leaving group and X is a Lewis base are known as mustards. Such compounds can form cyclic 
"onium" ions (sulfonium, ammoniums, etc.) that are good alkylating agents. Examples are bis (2-
chloroethyl) ether, the (2-haloethyl) amines (nitrogen mustards), and sulfur sesquimustard, which has 
two -chloroethyl thioether groups (ClH2C-CH2-S-) connected by an ethylene (-CH2CH2-) group. 
These compounds have a similar ability to alkylate DNA, but their physical properties, e.g. melting 
point, vary. 
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  Figure 4 shows Chloramine-T which was used in an early American 
anti-mustard gas ointment dispersed in vanishing cream. One Japanese decontamination ointment 
also used chloramine-T 
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